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ABSTRACT 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.16 set of 
standards, known as Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), 
is a family of standards widely deployed for wireless network access. Though 
WiMAX security vulnerabilities have been extensively analyzed, the IEEE 
802.16m-2011 standard incorporates the new advanced air interface (AAI), which 
is substantially different from legacy standards and justifies reexamination on a 
clean slate. In this research, the vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.16m-2011 control 
channels are examined at the medium-access (MAC) and the physical (PHY) 
layers with proposed attack vectors. Methodologies are proposed to overcome 
challenges in terms of the timing and power associated with manipulating control 
channels.   
 Attacks that manipulate the transmission power of mobile stations are 
examined in detail, while other attacks on IEEE 802.16m-2011, including 
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) disruption, network-entry disruption, and 
water-torture are also discussed. Out of fifteen vulnerabilities presented, thirteen 
were not previously identified for IEEE 802.16m-2011. Existing and new 
proposed vulnerabilities within legacy standards (specifically IEEE 802.16-2009) 
are also discussed, including transmission power manipulation, entry procedure 
attacks, water-torture attacks, and automatic repeat request attacks. Twelve of 
eighteen vulnerabilities presented were not previously discussed. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction. Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is a 
next-generation wireless data-communications standard poised to dominate 
mobile data connectivity in the commercial and military arenas. However, the 
security and robustness of the commercial standard need to be examined and 
risks mitigated before they can be considered for military applications. At the 
same time, with the proliferation of WiMAX networks worldwide, the ability to 
exploit or disrupt operations can be of operational worth. 
Related Works. Much work has been accomplished to evaluate security 
concerns and vulnerabilities within the IEEE 802.16 standards.  The majority of 
works reviewed, including [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6] and [7], exploited WiMAX Media 
Access Control (MAC) management/control messages that were not 
authenticated or encrypted, giving rise to man-in-the-middle attack vulnerabilities. 
The release of IEEE 802.16m-2011 saw a substantially revised MAC and 
physical (PHY) layers in the form of the advanced air interface (AAI), which 
essentially can be likened to a new standard built to run in harmony with previous 
legacy standards. This fundamentally new interface warrants a fresh examination 
for vulnerabilities, and Blair [8] performed such an examination. He highlighted 
vulnerabilities related to the lack of authentication for ranging and capability 
negotiation messages, which are exchanged prior to execution of the 
authentication process. An attacker can spoof a ranging response message with 
abort flag set to deny entry to mobile stations (MSs). Alternatively, capability 
negotiation messages can be altered to cause a low security connection to be 
formed to compromise data sent during the session. 
In this thesis, methods of manipulating the WiMAX control channel for 
both IEEE 802.16m-2011 and the legacy IEEE 802.16-2009 are explored. 
 
 xxiv
MAC Management Messages. MAC management messages are a key 
part of WiMAX control channels and are secured by two types of protection. The 
integrity check value (ICV) affords complete protection, including confidentiality, 
integrity, and authenticity, first introduced with IEEE 802.16m-2011. Cypher-
based message authentication code (CMAC) and hashed message 
authentication code (HMAC) provides authenticity and integrity protection but no 
encryption. For these to be used, a security association needs to be established, 
which includes authentication as well as key exchange. While ICV and 
CMAC/HMAC were extended to more and more control messages over the 
years, there are still messages that remain unprotected. 
Spoofing and Injection of Control Messages. Most vulnerabilities 
involve an intruding station (IS) spoofing false MAC management messages at 
the ABS or an AMS. In contention-based wireless standards such as IEEE 
802.11 (Wifi), knowing the frequency as well as key parameters is sufficient for 
an attacker to start injecting messages. The time-division multiple access 
(TDMA) and orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDMA) nature of 
WiMAX means that, on top of knowing normal parameters, transmitting on the 
correct sub-carriers and at the correct timing is also crucial. Most literature 
discusses vulnerabilities of MAC management messages assuming they can be 
injected successfully without discussing details. Boom correctly identified that the 
single biggest challenge in mounting attacks on TDMA systems is timing [9].  
The challenges and proposed solutions for injecting MAC management 
messages, both at advanced base stations (ABSs) and advanced mobile stations 
(AMSs), are examined in detail in this thesis. The attacker will first need to attain 
downlink synchronization by detecting and decoding preambles. The connection 
identifiers (CID) of targeted AMS need to be acquired by listening to the AMS 
when it joins the network. The downlink medium access protocol (DL-MAP) and 
uplink medium access protocol (UL-MAP), which contain resource allocations for 
each frame, need to be decoded. The attacker can then know when and which  
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sub-carriers to inject the formulated messages. IEEE802.16m-2011 scrambles 
assignment MAPs for unicast messages, leaving only broadcast messages that 
can be located and exploited.  
Several different scenarios exist, depending on whether we are injecting 
on the uplink (to the BS) or the downlink (to the MS) and whether location of the 
subject is known. The timing for injected messages needs to be referenced to the 
ABS, which means propagation delay from the attacker to the subject (including 
their relative positions) needs to be factored in, and transmission timing 
advanced or retarded if necessary. If the subject’s precise location is known, 
timing and power adjustments can be estimated from the distances among the 
attacker, BS, and MS. If the location of the MS that we plan to inject messages 
into is unknown, we can attempt transmission of an injected message over 
multiple attempts over a selected range bounded by the cell’s dimension until the 
transmission commencement falls within the guard interval window. If injecting 
into an uplink, the attacker can use the initial ranging process to obtain the 
precise timing, frequency, and power adjustments required to obtain a nominal 
signal at the BS. 
As the formulated signal needs to overcome a real signal, the power 
incident upon the subject needs to be sufficiently higher. The attacker’s 
transmission power is thus targeted to be higher than the nominal signal by the 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) requirement for the modulation scheme. 
Formulated message need to take the effects of automatic repeat request 
(ARQ) into consideration, incorporating sequence numbers as well as being 
longer than a ARQ block to ensure that the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) test 
passes and the message is accepted.  
The position uncertainty of the MS, BS, and attacker and the 
corresponding variations in propagation delay were analyzed against the guard 
interval (GI) between OFDM symbols. It was found that the guard interval is more 
than sufficient to handle uncertainties foreseen. 
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Power Related Attacks on IEEE 802.16m-2011. Having proposed the 
means to inject MAC management messages, we proceed to discuss a class of 
attack that involves injecting messages to manipulate the uplink power control of 
AMSs. One possibility of attacking uplink power management is to inject an 
uplink noise and interference level broadcast (AAI-ULPC-NI) message with a low 
or high noise and interference (NI) value. If a low value is injected, the AMS 
transmission power drops and its bit error rate increases—or reception may be 
eliminated altogether. If a high NI value is injected, the high signal strength may 
increase interference for cells in the vicinity using the same frequencies. AAI-
ULPC-NI is a broadcast message, and all AMSs within the cell served by the 
ABS can be affected. Although all AMSs can potentially be affected, timing 
adjustment from attacker to individual AMSs also needs to be correct for the 
AMS to take in the broadcast correctly. 
In another possibility for attacking uplink power management, the SINRtgt 
parameter might be manipulated by spoofing a system configuration descriptor 
(AAI-SCD) message with amended “dataSinrMin”, “gammaIotFpx” and “alpha” 
parameters. 
Other Attacks on IEEE 802.16m-2011. Multiple input multiple output 
(MIMO) parameters can be doctored to disrupt network operations.  By spoofing 
the AAI-SCD message with a false "Alpha" parameter (which indicates the 
number of receive antennas), an AMS attempting to join a network can possibly 
be confused as to the actual number of receive antennas on the ABS and adopt 
the wrong MIMO scheme as well as the wrong parameters and codes, disrupting 
communications. Another attack vector involves spoofing the AAI-SBC-REQ 
message during initial network entry, indicating lower or erroneous MIMO 
parameters. Alternatively, an AAI-SBC-RSP management message can be 
spoofed with MIMO settings that do not match those requested by AMS. As a 
result, a mismatch in parameters between ABS and AMS can arise that can 
disrupt communications. 
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The ABS can be flooded to deny service to legitimate AMSs. Repeated 
transmission of AAI-RNG-REQ messages can tie up ABS resources and deny 
entry for legitimate AMSs. During network entry, by injecting AAI-RES-CMD 
before security association is formed by the targeted AMS, an attacker can cause 
the AMS to abort the process and reset its MAC. 
An AMS in sleep mode to conserve battery power can be forced to be 
awake longer than necessary by an attacker spoofing AAI-TRF-IND, thus, 
draining its battery faster. This vulnerability has been identified in legacy systems 
in [2], [4], and [5] and is verified as still present within IEEE 802.16m-2011. 
Alternatively, AMSs in idle mode to conserve power can be forced to join a 
network by an attacker spoofing AAI-PAG-ADV, also draining its battery faster. 
An AAI-RNG-ACK message can be spoofed with incorrect timing, 
frequency, and power adjustments to disrupt network entry.  
Blair proposed spoofing AAI-SBC-REQ with a low or nil encryption/ 
decryption capability class [8]. Alternatively, an attacker can issue an AAI_SBC-
RSP management message with capability classes that do not match those 
requested by the AMS. 
An attacker can spoof AAI-NBR-ADV with a nonexistent BS or by falsely 
reporting poor characteristics of neighboring BSs to hamper MSs from initiating 
handover to a BS with better characteristics. This vulnerability was identified for 
the legacy standard [2, 5] and was found to still exist in IEEE 802.16m. 
An AAI-LBS-ADV message can be spoofed with wrong latitude and 
longitude coordinates for the serving and neighboring ABSs to confuse an AMS 




Attacks on Legacy Systems. An AAS_Beam_Select message can be 
spoofed to inform the BS of a preferred beam radically different from that 
previously selected to disrupt communications. 
By spoofing an FPC message, the attacker can reduce or increase the MS 
transmission power over a range of +32 dB to -32dB, in steps of 0.25 dB [5]. 
All ARQ messages are unprotected and can be leveraged to disrupt 
communications. ARQ-Reset, ARQ-Discard, and ARQ Feedback can be spoofed 
to misalign ARQ sequences between the BS and MS. The vulnerability of ARQ-
Reset is identified in previous literature [3]. 
PRC-LT-CTRL message can be spoofed to turn on/off long-term MIMO 
precoding with feedback and to change precoding application delay with the 
objective of causing a mismatch between the BS and MS, disrupting 
communications. 
The BS can be flooded to deny service to legitimate MSs. Repeated 
transmission of RNG-REQ messages can tie up ABS resources and deny entry 
for legitimate MSs. During network entry by victim AMSs, by injecting RES-CMD 
before the security association is formed, an attacker can cause the MS to abort 
the process and reset its MAC. 
 MSs in sleep mode can be forced to wake up sooner than necessary, 
thus draining their battery faster by spoofing MOB-TRF-IND [2], [4], and [5]. As 
for MSs in idle mode, they can be forced to join a network by an attacker’s 
spoofing MOB-PAG-ADV to drain the battery. 
An attacker can spoof MOB-NBR-ADV with a nonexistent BS or by falsely 
reporting poor characteristics of neighboring BSs to hamper MSs from initiating 
handover to a BS with better characteristics [4, 5]. 
The UCD, DCD, UL-MAP, and DL-MAP together serve to define the UL 
and DL channels. Modification or scrambling of these unprotected management 
messages will result in disruption of communications. 
 xxix
An attacker can spoof DBPC-REQ to request a BS to change its 
communication profile to one with a higher data rate but less robustness, i.e., a 
profile unsuitable for prevailing channel conditions. This can result in high error 
rates, disrupting communications [5]. 
An attacker may spoof CLK-CMP messages to misalign MS/BS clocks. 
Conclusion. While IEEE 802.16-2009 offered significant improvements 
over its predecessors, a number of control messages still remain unauthenticated 
and unencrypted. In addition to the vulnerabilities identified in the literature, 
twelve attack vectors using control messages are proposed in this thesis. 
IEEE 802.16m-2011 is a significant revision (with a new set of control 
messages), structurally enhanced to increase privacy and raise barriers to 
attacks while maintaining backward compatibility with legacy standards. By 
introducing encryption for some control messages, the new standard reduces the 
exposure of system operating information that may be used against it. More 
significantly, by scrambling the advanced medium access protocol (A-MAP) 
using secret initial vectors exchanged securely during security negotiations upon 
network entry, the passive listener will have difficulty identifying how radio 
resources are allocated or destination and originator AMS. This effectively 
prevents exploitation of all unicast control messages and enhances privacy. 
Nonetheless, broadcast control messages are still open to exploitation, and a 
significant number of vulnerabilities in IEEE 802.16-2009 still exist in this 
revision. In addition to the vulnerabilities identified in the literature, thirteen attack 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The last three decades saw phenomenal growth in terms of information 
technology, and, in tandem, telecommunications and networks. In this 
information age, the generation, processing, distribution, and consumption of 
information drives numerous aspects of warfare, business, and everyday life. The 
proliferation of the Internet’s reach and the explosion of online content has driven 
demand for mobile data communications. On the commercial front, we have seen 
tremendous leaps from low-speed, low-mobility capabilities to third-generation 
broadband, with market penetration outstripping that of landline phones in many 
countries. 
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is a next-
generation, wireless data-communications standard poised to dominate mobile 
data connectivity in the commercial and military arenas. Numerous WiMAX 
networks are deployed worldwide (see Figure 1). WiMAX Forum states that 
WiMAX subscriptions exceeded 20 million in 2011, with more than $502 million 
spent on WiMAX equipment in Quarter 1 of 2011 alone [1]. Meanwhile, 
population coverage has broken through the 800 million mark (see Figure 2) and 
is fast approaching a billion [2]. 
On the military front, developments in network-centric warfare, unmanned 
vehicles, and sensor networks have driven the capability development and 
bandwidth requirements of mobile-data connectivity. Cost and budgetary 
pressures in the developed world have caused defense budgets to be pared and 
militaries to leverage commercial technologies more and more, resulting in shifts 




Figure 1.   Pictorial representation of WiMAX deployments (From [3]). 
 
Figure 2.   Population coverage of WiMAX deployments [2]. 
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However, the security and robustness of the commercial standard must be 
examined and the risks understood and mitigated before it can be considered for 
military applications. At the same time, with the proliferation of WiMAX networks 
worldwide, the ability to exploit or disrupt operations can be of operational value. 
B. WIMAX STANDARD DEVELOPMENT  
The IEEE 802.16 group of standards had its beginnings in 1998, when a 
group was formed to develop the fourth generation of air-interface standards for 
wireless broadband. The initial standard had a single-carrier, physical layer 
operating from 10 GHz - 66 GHz for line-of-sight (LOS) operations, with many 
MAC-layer concepts adapted from the cable modem DOCSIS (data over cable 
service interface specifications) standard. 
Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) was subsequently 
incorporated to mitigate multipath fading, and operating frequencies of 2–11 GHz 
were adopted to enable near line-of-sight (NLOS) operations instead of LOS.  
Orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) was another key 
feature adopted later, resulting in IEEE 802.16-2004, which, forming the first 
baseline standard, superseded all previous versions. Up to this point, all 
standards were designed for fixed or nomadic applications. IEEE 802.16e was 
developed and released in 2005, providing support for mobile nodes and 
incorporating new security features. 
The next key milestone was IEEE 802.16-2009, which includes important 
enhancements such as support for 20 MHz bandwidth, improved multi-antenna 
transmission and processing schemes, and enhanced multicast, broadcast, and 
location-based services. Within IEEE 802.16m-2011, the advanced air interface 
(AAI) was developed to meet the requirements of ITU-R/IMT-Advanced for 4G 
systems. Relying on available bandwidth and multi-antenna mode, IEEE 
802.16m systems are now capable of over-the-air transfer rates in excess of 
1 Gbit/sec while maintaining interoperability with legacy equipment built to 
preceding standards. 
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C. RELATED WORK 
Much work has been accomplished to evaluate security concerns and 
vulnerabilities within IEEE 802.16 standards. Some of these concerns are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
1. Lack of Encryption and/or Authentication for MAC 
Management/ Control Messages 
The vast majority of works reviewed, including [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] and 
[10], exploited WiMAX MAC management/control messages that were not 
authenticated or encrypted, giving rise to man-in-the-middle attack vulnerabilities.  
Han et al. in [5] as well as Rahman et al. in [10] exploited the fact that 
even with newer versions of legacy WiMAX (up to IEEE 802.16-2009), which 
offered authentication for selected management messages, the initial ranging 
process (part of the network entry process) was not protected. Hence, an 
attacker could modify management messages and force a low security 
configuration for the network session. Similar vulnerabilities also provided 
avenues for an attacker to modify unprotected messages to trigger an abortion of 
the ranging process, hence aborting network entry. Lack of authentication of 
sleep mode messages was also exploited to trigger mobile stations to enter sleep 
mode. 
Bakthavathsalu et al. in [6] leveraged similar weaknesses to spoof 
unprotected messages within network entry authentication processes to force 
MSs entering the network into authorization wait states, disrupting network entry 
processes. Even after network entry, unauthenticated ARQ messages could also 
be spoofed to reset ARQ sequence numbers at MSs, disrupting communications. 
Taha et al. in [7], as well as Andreas in [8], highlighted the same lack of 
authentication, which can lead to water-torture attacks in which sleeping MSs are 
forced to wake up by an attacker injecting traffic indication messages, indicating 
the presence of messages awaiting the sleeping MS. In addition, attackers could 
falsify neighbor advertisement messages to disrupt the handover process. 
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Deininger et al. in [8] went on to discuss related security weaknesses valid 
for IEEE 802.16-2009 and earlier. The fast power control message (FPC) can be 
altered to increase or decrease the power of MSs. Messages can be spoofed to 
remove MSs from multi-cast polling groups. An MS can also be force into a 
downlink burst profile not suitable for its operating environment, adversely 
affecting error rates and throughput. Power control mode can also be 
manipulated. 
2. Weakness of Symmetrical Keys for Multicast/Broadcast 
Deininger et al. in [8] also discuss the inherent weakness of using 
symmetrical keys for multicast and broadcast. For practical considerations and 
efficiency, the same set of symmetrical keys is used for all BSs and MSs for 
encryption and decryption of multicast and broadcast traffic. However, this 
means that if one node is compromised, all multicast and broadcast traffic is 
compromised.  
3. Weakness in Encryption Algorithm 
According to [4], IEEE 802.16-2004 supports only the data encryption 
standard (DES), for which weaknesses have been uncovered and which is 
deemed less secure. IEEE 802.16e-2005 includes support for the advanced 
encryption standard (AES), which resolved this issue, and, for the time being, is 
deemed secure enough for the federal government to use to protect sensitive 
data. 
4.  Progressive Elimination of Security Gaps 
The persistent and good work of the above researchers prompted review 
of and incremental improvements in protection for later versions of the standard 
through selective introduction of authentication for management messages. 
Thus, some of the vulnerabilities seen in the past have been removed in 
revisions of WiMAX.  
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5. New AAI Interface for IEEE 802.16m Warrants Fresh 
Vulnerability Assessment on a Clean Slate 
The release of IEEE 802.16m-2011 saw a substantially revised MAC and 
PHY in the form of the advanced air interface (AAI), which can be likened to a 
new standard built to run in harmony with previous legacy standards. This 
fundamentally new interface warrants a fresh examination for vulnerabilities, and 
Blair [11] performed such an examination. He highlighted vulnerabilities related to 
the lack of authentication for ranging and capability negotiation messages that 
are exchanged before execution of the authentication process. An attacker could 
spoof ranging response messages with the abort flag set to deny entry to MSs. 
Alternatively, capability negotiation messages could be altered to cause a low 
security connection to be formed to compromise data sent during the session. 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This project involves exploring methods of hacking into and manipulating 
the WiMAX control channel. This thesis research can serve as a starting point to 
protect, as well as to exploit, protocol weaknesses in WiMAX, thus opening 
exploitation space. 
E. RESEARCH SCOPE 
The focus of this research is on IEEE 802.16m-2011, which, besides 
offering advanced capabilities, extends support for all legacy standards. 
Coverage on the legacy standard IEEE 802.16-2009 is included when relevant 
and appropriate.  
The system boundary is set at interactions within a cell supported by an 
advanced base station and its sectors where applicable. For the purposes of this 
research, we limit ourselves to the time-division duplexing (TDD) configuration for 
WiMAX deployment, as this is by far the most popular configuration deployed. 
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F. ORGANIZATION 
A brief overview of the IEEE 802.16m-2011 and IEEE 802.16-2009 are 
presented in Chapter II to form a foundation for later material. Protection 
schemes in WiMAX for control messages and the extent of their coverage are 
introduced in Chapter III. Investigation efforts are thus focused on unprotected 
messages. In Chapter IV, the methodology for spoofing control messages within 
a challenging time-division multiple access (TDMA) regime is proposed. With the 
target and tools identified, previously identified attack vectors for IEEE 802.16m-
2011 and legacy standards are discussed and new attack vectors are proposed 
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II. IEEE 802.16M-2011 - ADVANCED AIR INTERFACE 
An overview of the IEEE 802.16m-2011 standard is presented in this 
chapter to form a basis for discussion in subsequent chapters. Emphasis is 
placed on concepts relevant to this research topic. An overview is first provided 
with reference model and state diagrams, to form a context and foundation. 
Subsequently, MAC and PHY functions are dealt with in detail. Although this 
research covers IEEE 802.16-2009, in the interests of space, an overview is not 
provided, though relevant differences are highlighted when discussing 
vulnerabilities.  
A.  OVERVIEW 
The reference model of the IEEE 802.16m-2011 standard is shown in 
Figure 3; it is defined in line with the open systems interconnection (OSI) model. 
The standard’s scope, however, is limited to the MAC and PHY layer.  
The MAC layer consists of three sublayers, the service specific 
convergence sublayer (CS), the MAC common part sublayer (CPS), and the 
security sublayer. The service specific CS provides transformation and mapping 
of network layer data into MAC service data units (SDU), as well as header 
suppression functions. Different CSs are provided for different network layer 
protocols. The MAC CPS contains the core functionality of the standard, 
including system access, bandwidth allocation, connection establishment, and 
connection maintenance. The security sublayer performs authentication, secure 
key exchange, and encryption functions. 
The interfaces between layers are defined as service access points (SAP), 
with data entering a sublayer referred to as service data unit (SDU) and data 









The contents of the protocol stack are illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   IEEE 802.16m general protocol stack (From [14]). 
The radio resource control and management group include a number of 
functional blocks. The radio resource management block adjusts radio network 
parameters according to load and environment. The mobility management block 
monitors neighboring base stations (BSs) and makes handover decisions. The 
network entry management block controls network entry procedures and 
sequences. The location management block manages location-based services 
(LBS). The idle mode management block controls idle mode operation. The 
security management block performs key management. The system 
configuration block manages system configuration and generates broadcast 
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control messages such as superframe headers. The multicast and broadcast 
service (MBS) block controls and generates MBS messages. The service flow 
and connection management block manages and allocates station identifiers 
(STIDs) and flow identifiers (FIDs). The multi-carrier block allows a single MAC to 
control multiple physical layers. 
The medium access control (MAC) function group on the control plane 
consists of a number of functional blocks. The PHY control block performs 
signaling such as ranging, channel quality measurement/ feedback (CQI), and 
hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) ACK or negative acknowledgement 
(NACK) signaling. The control signaling block generates resource allocation 
messages such as advanced medium access protocol (A-MAP) and control 
messages. The sleep-mode management block oversees sleep operations and is 
responsible for related messages. The quality-of-service block manages data 
rate according to quality-of-service (QoS) inputs from connection management 
block. The scheduling and resource-multiplexing block schedules and 
multiplexes data based on requirements and subchannel characteristics. The 
interference management block performs inter-BS coordination as well as intra-
BS measures to manage interference. 
The medium access control function group on the data plane consists of a 
number of functional blocks. The fragmentation/packing block fragments and 
packs MAC SDU based on inputs from scheduling and resource multiplexing 
block. The automatic repeat request (ARQ) block generates sequentially 
numbered ARQ blocks from MAC SDUs from the same flow. The MAC protocol 
data unit formation block constructs MAC PDUs. 




Figure 5.   IEEE 802.16m mobile station state transition diagram (From [14]). 
During initialization state, mobile station without active connections scans 
and synchronizes to cell, acquiring cell identification and system configuration 
information.  
During access state, mobile station performs network entry through 
ranging and uplink synchronization, capability negotiation, authentication, 
authorization and key exchange, registration, and service flow establishment.  
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During connected state, mobile station performs uplink and downlink 
communications with the following sub-modes: active mode, sleep mode and 
scanning mode. Active mode is the mode where normal communications occur. 
On downlink communications, channel quality measurements are performed by 
the MS. These measurement results are sent to the BS for the BS scheduler to 
adapt its uplink and downlink assignments to channel conditions. Sleep mode is 
used by the MS to minimize power drain and radio resources. Traffic indication 
message from the BS alerts the sleeping MS that a message is incoming. 
Scanning mode is used by the MS to prepare for handover. The MS can be 
instructed to enter this mode, where the MS scans for other BSs. 
During idle state, the MS becomes unregistered and is only able to receive 
downlink broadcasts. If pre-negotiated with paging available, the MS can be 
paged, causing it to enter access state for network reentry. 
B. MEDIA ACCESS LAYER 
1. Addressing 
All mobile terminals are uniquely identified by a 48-bit universal MAC 
address. Within the IEEE 802.16-2009, all connections are uniquely identified by 
16-bit connection identifiers (CIDs). With the IEEE 802.16m-2011, there are two 
addressing identifiers instead of the CID (Figure 6): the station identifier (STID), 
which is 12-bits long and used to identify an AMS; and the flow identifier (FID), 
which is 4-bits long and used to address active service flows of an AMS. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Illustration of IEEE 802.16m.2011 addressing. 
This enables greater efficiency, as the advanced generic medium access 
header (AGMH) for MAC PDUs need only contain FIDs, while the STIDs need  
 
STID (12 bits) FID (4 bits) 
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only be included within the assignment advanced medium access protocol (A-A-
MAP), which maps out radio resources (in terms of sub-carriers and time) as 
bursts for individual AMS.  
2. MAC Headers 
The AGMH is used with MAC management messages or with user 
payload (see Figure 7). This header is significantly smaller than legacy headers 
due to the removal of CID (16 bits), which is replaced with FID (four bits). 
Extended headers can be added as required, while MAC signaling headers do 
not carry user payload but are used for control and management signaling. 
These include bandwidth request, reports, and feedback functions. 
 
Figure 7.   MAC headers and extended headers (From [14]). 
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3. Mobility Management and Handover 
Handover can be AMS initiated or ABS initiated. A series of MAC 
management messages are sent over the air, as well as the backhaul (between 
serving base station and target base station). In both cases, the serving base 
station (S-BS) sends a HO-REQ message to the target base station (T-BS), 
which replies with a HO-RSP to the S-BS. If handover can proceed, S-BS issues 
an AAI-HO-CMD message to the AMS. The AMS then replies with an AAI-HO-
IND message before commencing a network reentry procedure with T-BS. Upon 
completion, T-BS sends HO-COMPLT to S-BS. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   General handover flow (From [14]). 
4. Quality of Service 
A unidirectional flow of user data packets is associated with a service flow 
identifier (SFID), which in turn has an associated QoS. The QoS represents the 
tradeoff and prioritization of resources to ensure a satisfactory level of 
experience by different applications and users of the system. QoS classes range 
from unsolicited grant service (UGS) meant for providing fixed and constant 
bandwidth for real-time applications (much like dedicated circuits) to best effort 
(BE), which supports non-time-sensitive applications. A summary of QoS classes 
available for use is given in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   QoS classes. 
 
 
5. MAC Management / Control Messages 
MAC management/control messages form an important part of the many 
control channels. Messages are put into PDUs and transported over broadcast or 
unicast connections. Hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) is used for MAC 
messages sent over unicast control connections. Some of these message types 
are encrypted and protected with integrity check value (ICV) and some are 
authenticated with cypher-based message authentication code (CMAC), while 
others are not protected. An entirely new set of messages (besides legacy ones 
that are still supported) is defined for IEEE 802.16m-2011, which is prefixed with 
“AAI.” 
6. Connection and Session Management 
In IEEE 802.16m-2011, connections are identified by a combination of 
STID (12 bits) and FID (four bits). Management connections carry MAC 
management messages and are bidirectional, which is established upon 
successful registration of AMS. Transport connections carry user data and are 
unidirectional. 
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Service flows are created through the dynamic service 
addition/change/delete family of MAC control messages with QoS associated. 
These service flows are uniquely mapped to FIDs. 
In IEEE 802.16-2009, a connection is identified by a 16-bit connection ID 
(CID) and are all unidirectional. The three types of management connections are 
basic (for short and time-sensitive MAC messages), primary (for long and delay-
tolerant MAC messages), and secondary. 
7. Mobility and Power Management 
The vast majority of WiMAX devices are mobile, and power conservation 
for these battery-operated devices is important. Two modes of operation are 
provided to reduce battery drain. 
An AMS in sleep mode remains in the connected state but has pre-
negotiated periods of absence. A series of alternate listening and sleep windows 
are available, and these can be dynamically switched between sixteen patterns 
available (only three modes are available with the legacy system). During an 
AMS’s listening window, the ABS can transmit traffic indication messages to 
indicate the presence of traffic due for the AMS. If there is no traffic due, the AMS 
reverts to sleep mode for the rest of the listening window, saving more power. 
An AMS in Idle state is only available periodically for DL broadcast traffic 
messaging without registering at an ABS. This allows further reduction in power 
and radio resources. An idle AMS wakes at paging intervals and monitors paging 
broadcast messages sent by the ABS. An AMS can terminate the idle state and 
transit into the access state to perform network-reentry procedures with ABS. 
8. Scheduling Services 
The scheduler takes into consideration the bandwidth request, QoS 
associated with the service flow, and channel conditions of the MSs to allocate 
radio resources (in terms of subcarriers and time within each OFDMA frame), to 
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decide the modulation and coding scheme (MCS), and to determine the MIMO 
parameters used for individual service flows. 
9. Bandwidth Request and Allocation 
Transmission bandwidth is centrally controlled by the ABS, and the AMS 
needs to signal the ABS to request bandwidth to adjust to traffic conditions. It has 
several means to do this [15] (Section 16.2.11.1). Firstly, a contention-based 
random access bandwidth request can be used. The MS can do this by 
transmitting a bandwidth request pre-amble sequence and a quick-access 
message (12 bits) on the bandwidth request channel. This process is illustrated 
in Figure 9. Secondly, a standalone bandwidth request header can be used by 
the AMS to send a bandwidth request in step three of the “five-step, contention-
based random access BR” procedure or as a response to the polling from ABS.  
 
Figure 9.   Contention-based bandwidth request (three step and five step) 
(From [15] section 16.2.11.1.1). 
Thirdly, piggybacked bandwidth request can be used by an AMS to 
request bandwidth for the same or a different connection by attaching an 
extender header to a MAC PDU carrying a data payload. Fourthly, bandwidth 
request can also be done through primary fast-feedback channel (P-FBCH) in 
one of the two ways. The first way involves utilizing the bandwidth request 
indication flag feedback. An AMS can send a specific codeword (representing a 
BR indication flag) on the P-FBCH to indicate to the ABS its intention to request 
UL allocation, without the need to perform a random access bandwidth request. 
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The second way is termed the extended real-time packet service (ErtPS)/ 
adaptive granting and polling (aGP) service bandwidth request. By sending a 
specific codeword through P-FBCH, the AMS can inform the ABS of pending 
ertPS data. 
10. Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ)/Hybrid Automatic Repeat 
Request (HARQ) 
ARQ and HARQ are schemes for error control. An ARQ block can be 
generated from one or more MAC service data units (SDUs) or MAC SDU 
fragment(s). ARQ blocks are sequentially numbered and can vary in size. ARQ 
and HARQ can be applied on a flow at the same time. Should the HARQ checks 
fail, the HARQ entity can inform the ARQ entity to trigger retransmission and re-
segmentation of ARQ blocks. For the downlink, IEEE 802.16m uses adaptive 
synchronous HARQ, where resource allocation and transmission format for 
retransmission may vary from that of the original transmission, and control 
signals are needed to indicate changes. For uplink, a non-adaptive synchronous 
HARQ scheme is used, meaning that the parameters and resource allocation for 
the retransmission are known in advance. An illustration of HARQ operation in 
TDD mode for DL and UL [14] is provided in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Example of TDD DL and UL HARQ timings (From [14]) (continued on 
next page) 
 
HARQ for DL Transmission 
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Figure 10 (continuted from previous page). 
 
11. Security Sublayer 
The diagram in Figure 11 provides an overview of IEEE 802.16m security 
architecture. Entities can be grouped into two categories: security management 
or encryption and integrity. The latter consists of a user data encryption and 
authentication entity and a management message authentication/confidentiality 
entity, as well as an authentication entity for standalone signaling headers.  
The advanced encryption standard (AES) counter mode with cipher block 
chaining message authentication code (CCM), often referred to as AES-CCM, is 
a symmetrical block cipher supported by IEEE 802.16m, providing authentication 
and privacy. The encryption and integrity entities rely on AES-CCM to provide 
confidentiality and integrity functions under the control of the security 
management entities.  
Security management entities consist of overall security management and 
control entity, authentication and security association (SA) control entity, privacy 
key management (PKM3) entity, extensible authentication protocol (EAP) entity, 
and location privacy entity. 
The overall security management and control entity manages and 
coordinates the operation of the other security entities. The authentication and 
SA control entity manages the formation of security associations. The SA 
contains information related to a connection, such as the level of security applied 
or UL and DL traffic encryption keys (if applicable). Some of these are dependent 
on the outcome of capability negotiation, where ABS and AMS agree on the level 
HARQ for UL Transmission 
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of security to adopt. The PKM3 entity is responsible for performing mutual and 
unilateral authentication and establishes confidentiality between the ABS and 
AMS through a series of steps and algorithms that ensure secure key exchange 
through an unsecure connection. The EAP encapsulation/de-encapsulation entity 
is responsible for exchanging EAP messages as part of PKM3 to perform 
authentication and authorization functions.  
The last entity is the location privacy entity. IEEE 802.16-2009 does not 
provide means of concealing the identity of AMS. A real MAC address is used 
during initial ranging and registration during network entry, and the connection 
IDs (CIDs) issued in plain can be used to identify and track an MS throughout the 
whole session. IEEE 802.16m provides the means to use a pseudo identity 
during network entry, and the station ID (STID) used to address AMSs is issued 
under protection of encryption. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Functional blocks within 802.16m security architecture (From [14]). 
C. PHYSICAL LAYER 
1. Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access 
Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) is a form of multi-
carrier modulation technique that distributes data across multiple carriers. These 
carriers’ frequencies are selected such that adjacent subcarriers are separated 
by the subcarrier symbol rate, therefore, maintaining spectral orthogonality. This 
essentially enables high data throughput while limiting the effects of inter-symbol-
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interference (ISI) and multipath distortion, since OFDM symbol duration is made 
much longer than is the case without multiple carriers. In addition, a cyclically 
extended guard interval, where each OFDM symbol is prefixed with a periodic 
extension of the signal itself, can be added, called a cyclic prefix (CP). Thus, 
when this guard interval is longer than multipath delay, the ISI can be effectively 
eliminated [14]. To support multiple users, the whole OFDM channel can be time-
multiplexed among different users. This process is illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.   OFDM generation and cyclic prefix (From [14]). 
Orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) takes the time 
multiplexed OFDM concept one step further by simultaneously multiplexing 
across the frequency domain (see Figure 13). This is done by allowing the 
assignment of subcarriers to different users over time. Hence, radio resources 
can be divided in a granular manner into resource blocks and assigned to users 
dynamically, on the fly, by a scheduler. The scheduler can take channel 
conditions and the QoS of the service flow into consideration and, among other 
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factors, optimize every frame in a manner that is responsive to demand. OFDMA 
is available for use in IEEE 802.16 for both UL and DL. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Conceptual comparison between OFDM and OFDMA (From [16]). 
2. Frame Structure 
The IEEE 802.16m frame is illustrated in Figure 14. A super frame 
consists of four frames lasting 5 ms each. Within each frame are subframes with 
transmit/receive switching intervals included. Each subframe consists of a 
number of OFDM symbols with CP before each symbol. How the system 




Figure 14.   Frame structure illustration for TDD and CP=1/8 (From [15] section 
16.3.3.2.2). 




Available physical OFDM subcarriers and OFDM symbols are grouped 
into physical resource units (PRUs), and these are remapped into two types of 
logical entities: contiguous resource units (CRUs) and distributed resource units 
(DRUs). Partitioning frequencies in this manner facilitates fractional frequency 
reuse (FFR). CRUs are optimized for frequency scheduling gain, while DRUs are 
good for frequency diversity gain [14]. The mapping process is illustrated in 
Figure 15, which shows how PRUs are grouped into CRUs and DRUs and 
mapped into Logical Resource Units (LRUs).  
 
 
Figure 15.   Physical to logical mapping process (From [14]). 
4. Channel Coding and Modulation 
The role of channel coding is to introduce redundancy into the data 
transmitted to enable correction of bit errors at the receiver end without further 
intervention from the transmitter. The net effect is to decrease the error rate, 
reduce transmission power, and increase transmission distance [14]. For data 
channels, IEEE 802.16m uses convolutional turbo code (CTC) with a minimum 
code rate of 1/3. The coding and modulation process for traffic channels is 
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summarized in Figure 16. For control channels, a tail-biting convolutional code 
(TBCC) with minimum rate of ¼ is used for control channels. This form of coding 
is slower but more reliable. For HARQ feedback channels, HARQ incremental 
redundancy coding is used, while different versions of constellation 
rearrangement (CoRe) are used for 16QAM and 64QAM data. 
 
Figure 16.   Coding and modulation process (From [17]). 
Note that all data is randomized or scrambled as part of the coding and 
modulation process using a pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) generated 
by the circuit shown in Figure 17. This operation is performed on all data except 
the frame control header (FCH) and preambles, and the generator is reinitialized 
with a fixed sequence [LSB] 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 [MSB] for every forward 
error correction (FEC) block. Since the sequence is known and fixed, the 
scrambled data transmitted over the air can be decoded into plain data, and plain 
data can be encoded into scrambled data for transmission. For the purpose of 
this thesis, underlying plain data scrambled with this process is regarded as 
available, and scrambled data can be generated from any plain data desired. 
 
Figure 17.   PRBS generator (From [15] section 16.3.10.1.3). 
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5. Synchronization Channel 
The first step in network entry involves discovery, which is followed by 
timing and frequency acquisition, DL synchronization, and base-station 
identification. The primary advanced preamble (PA-Preamble) and secondary 
advanced preamble (SA-Preamble) within IEEE 802.16m provides a two-stage 
process to accomplish these. The PA-Preamble is located at the first OFDMA 
symbol within the second frame of the superframe. This narrowband 
synchronization signal is used for initial acquisition, synchronization, and 
broadcast of system information including the system bandwidth. The SA-
Preamble is located at the first OFDMA symbol within the first and third frames of 
a superframe. This wideband preamble is responsible for fine synchronization 
and cell/sector identification (Cell ID). 
The location of the advanced preambles is illustrated in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.   Location of preambles (From [11]). 
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6. Superframe Headers (Part of Broadcast Channel) 
After achieving synchronization and obtaining key system parameters 
from the advanced preambles, the superframe header contains the next batch of 
information essential for network entry, reentry, and communication 
maintenance. The superframe header is located in the first subframe of every 
superframe, occupying the second to the sixth OFDMA symbol of the subframe. 
The location of the SFH is illustrated in Figure 19. The primary superframe 
header (P-SFH) occupies the first few data logical-resource units (DLRU) within 
the SFH, and it is transmitted with fixed MCS: quadrature phase-shift keying 
(QPSK) with TBCC coding at 1/24 effective code rate. The secondary 
superframe header (S-SFH) occupies DLRUs after P-SFH, and it can be divided 
into three subtypes: sub-packet 1 with network reentry information, sub-packet 2 
with initial entry information, and sub-packet 3 with remaining system information. 
Transmission of S-SFH1, S-SFH2, and S-SFH3 are interspersed over several 
superframes; an example of this configuration is illustrated in Figure 20. 
Physical processing of SFH is illustrated in Figure 21.  
 
Figure 19.   Positioning of superframe header within superframe (From [15]). 
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Figure 20.   Illustration of secondary superframe header position across 
superframes (From [15]). 
 
Figure 21.   Processing for superframe headers (From [15] section 16.3.5.3.1.1). 
 
7. Downlink Control Channels 
There are two forms of downlink control: MAC control/management 
messages as discussed in earlier sections and medium access protocol (MAP). 
Within legacy frames, MAPs were broadcast messages that were time-division 
multiplexed with data and jointly encoded for use by all MSs. Their main purpose 
is to inform all users on radio resource allocation for the entire frame. Although 
the legacy MAPs are scrambled, the algorithm and its start states are known, 
and, for the purpose of this thesis, available to an attacker. Hence, the commonly 
decodable DL and UL MAPs enable all MSs to know exactly which subcarriers 
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and OFDMA symbols they are assigned for uplink and downlink. An illustration of 
legacy MAPs within context of a frame is provided in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Structure of legacy MAPs (After [14]). 
Within IEEE 802.16m, key changes include the fact that it is now 
frequency multiplexed rather than time multiplexed and that control data for 
AMSs use different MCS to suit channel conditions experienced by individual 
AMSs. The overheads located within the A-MAP, in the context of the IEEE 




Figure 23.   Structure of IEEE 802.16m overhead channels (From [14]). 
The internal structure of DL A-MAP is illustrated in Figure 24. There are 
four different types of DL A-MAP: non-user-specific A-MAP, assignment A-MAP,  
HARQ feedback A-MAP, and power control A-MAP. The non-user-specific A-
MAP contains common information for all AMSs, including parameters required 
to decode other control channels. The assignment A-MAP contains information 
on radio-resource assignment for broadcast, multicast and unicast 
communications for each individual AMS. Broadcast A-MAP information 
elements (IEs) are located at the beginning of either assignment A-MAP group 1 
or 2 within the subframe. The HARQ feedback A-MAP contains feedback 
information for the hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ). The power control 
A-MAP contains transmission power adjust values for each individual AMS, 





Figure 24.   Structure of A-MAP region for IEEE 802.16m-2011 (From [14]). 
The different channel coding processes for different A-MAPs [18] are 
depicted in Figure 25. Scrambling is performed for assignment A-MAPs 
(resource mapping) and HARQ data. Assignment A-MAPs information is first 
scrambled by a pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) generated by the 
circuit shown in Figure 26. If the assignment A-MAP is for unicast traffic, the 
random MAPMask-seed value is used to initialize the PRBS generator, and a 
CRC mask formed with the STID of the AMS is used to mask the A-MAP data 
([15] section 16.3.5.3.2.4). The MAPmask seed and STID are transferred by the 
ABS to AMS in an encrypted manner after AMS registration during network entry. 
If the assignment A-MAP is for broadcast traffic, both the initialization vector and 
CRC mask are fixed values instead of random. The above is summarized in 
Table 3. The net outcome is that the attacker needs to overcome the obstacles 
put in place by the MAPMask seed as well as the STID in order to eavesdrop, or 
even target unicast traffic bursts, in IEEE 802.16m-2011. On the other hand, 
broadcast traffic in IEEE 802.16m-2011 remains as vulnerable as in legacy 
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systems. It is also interesting to note that the HARQ feedback A-MAP is also 
scrambled, but only using STID, before coding and modulation. 
 
 
Figure 25.   Physical layer procedures for A-MAPs in IEEE 802.16m-2011 (From 
[18]). 
 
Figure 26.   PRBS generator for scrambling assignment A-MAP in IEEE 
802.16m-2011 (From [15] section 16.3.10.1.3). 
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8. Uplink Control Channels 
As previously seen in Figure 23, UL control channels are also frequency 
multiplexed. These UL control channels include the primary and secondary fast-
feedback, HARQ feedback, sounding, ranging, and bandwidth request channels. 
The primary and secondary fast-feedback channels carry different sets of 
channel quality as well as MIMO feedback. The primary fast-feedback channel 
carries wideband and narrowband channel quality indicators, while the secondary 
fast-feedback channel carries narrowband channel quality indicators. The 
structure and physical processing of these channels are illustrated in Figure 27. 
These feedback channels are frequency and time-division multiplexed in groups 
of feedback mini-tiles, and the secondary fast-feedback channels include pilots 
interspersed within them. 
For the HARQ feedback channel, the ACK and NACK for DL 
transmissions occurring at predetermined intervals are transmitted on this 
channel using a combined TDM/FDM and TDM/CDM scheme. The structure of 
the HARQ feedback channel is illustrated in Figure 28. The channels are divided 
into HARQ mini-tiles (constructed by two subcarriers over two OFDM symbols), 
with each HARQ mini-tile identified by two indices, m and k. The m index is the 
HARQ mini-tile index within a HARQ feedback channel, and the k index is the 




Figure 27.   Physical processing and structure of primary and secondary 
feedback channels (From [18]). 
 
Figure 28.   Structure of HARQ mini tile (From [15]). 
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The sounding channel is used by the AMS to transmit sounding signals 
when instructed by the ABS, enabling measurements of the UL channel for 
MIMO and channel quality feedbacks at the ABS. The structure of the sounding 
channel is illustrated in Figure 29. The sounding channel is located in the second 
UL sub-frame and, depending on whether narrow-band or wideband channel is 
configured, the number of subcarriers used varies.  
 
Figure 29.   Structure of sounding channel in TDD mode (From [14]). 
The ranging channel is used by the AMS to transmit ranging signals to 
initiate uplink synchronization. Upon receiving the incident signal, the ABS 
processes and computes important parameters such as power and frequency 
adjustments that will be feedback to the AMS. This allows the AMS to make 
adjustments, thereby attaining uplink synchronization and completing the initial 
ranging process. This initial ranging is contention based. Afterwards, the AMS 
can then proceed with network entry. For an AMS that has attained uplink 
synchronization, periodic (or synchronized) ranging needs to be performed 
continuously to maintain synchronization and is performed in a non-contention 
 38
manner. Ranging signals typically consist of ranging preambles (RP) as well as 
cyclic prefixes (CP) appended before the RPs. Examples of ranging signals 
under different circumstances are shown in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30.   Examples of ranging signals (From [18]). 
As for bandwidth request channel, since all radio resources are managed 
centrally by the base station, any desired change in uplink parameters needs to 
be requested through the ABS. A contention based random access scheme is 
used by AMSs to request bandwidth. It involves a five-step or three-step quick-
access procedure, illustrated in Figure 31. The physical channel structure for a 
bandwidth request channel is illustrated in Figure 32, subdivided into three UL 
tiles, where Pr denotes a preamble sequence. The quick-access message 
containing request information is QPSK modulated into 36 data symbols before 
being inserted into locations denoted by M within the three UL tiles (each 
containing 12 symbols) for transmission.  
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Figure 31.   Bandwidth request procedures (From [14]). 
 
Figure 32.   Bandwidth request channel physical structure (From [15]). 
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9. Multiple Antenna Transmission Schemes 
MIMO techniques are employed in IEEE 802.16m-2011 to achieve array 
gain, diversity gain, and spatial multiplexing gain to combat effects of multipath 
and channel spread.  
a. DL MIMO 
The wide range of MIMO modes available for downlink use can be 
broadly classified into single and multiple base-station modes.  
A multi-base-station MIMO is an extension which entails AMSs 
being served by multiple ABSs through inter-BS coordination or even multi-BS 
transmission. For collaborative MIMO, several MSs are jointly served by multiple 
coordinated BSs, whereas in closed-loop macro diversity, every MS is served 
jointly by multiple coordinated BSs.  
 
Single–user MIMO (SU-MIMO) techniques are point-to-point 
schemes that improve capacity and/or reliability through space-time/space-
frequency codes together with spatial diversity multiplexing transmission. In 
single user (SU) schemes, one MS is addressed in one resource unit, while for 
multi-user (MU) schemes, multiple users can be scheduled in one resource unit. 
 
Open-loop techniques are less reliant on channel information, 
including spatial multiplexing and space-time codes. These tend to result in a 
higher complexity burden at the receiver as well as less than optimal utilization of 
channel diversity or capacity. Closed-loop techniques make use of a feedback 
channel to relay channel information to the BS, enabling simpler techniques and 
better channel utilization [19]. 
A summary of how the preceding factors translate into actual MIMO 




Figure 33.   Summary of MIMO modes for DL (From [14]). 
b. UL MIMO 
MSs are constrained in terms of physical size and number of 
antennas. Hence, there are fewer options available for uplink MIMO. These 
MIMO modes include the open- and closed-loop versions of SU-MIMO and 
collaborative spatial multiplexing. 
D. NETWORK ENTRY PROCESS 
An AMS attempting network entry first commences downlink 
synchronization by means of the preambles and superframe headers before 
performing uplink synchronization through initial ranging. After ranging is 
complete, the ABS responds with an AAI-RNG-ACK message that contains 
power and timing adjust parameters to ensure uplink synchronization. It also 
issues a temporary station identifier (TSTID) along with a MAP mask seed and 
places them in the AAI-RNG-RSP message. 
Capability negotiation messages are then exchanged before 
authentication, which involves the secure exchange of several sets of keys. Once 
this is done, selected MAC control messages and data messages being 
exchanged are encrypted and authenticated.  
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The AMS then requests registration through the AAI-REG-REQ message. 
Upon successful registration at the ABS, a response message, AAI-REG-RSP, is 
transmitted to the AM; the AAI-REG-RSP message conveys the real STID as 
well as the MAP mask seed. These two parameters, which are hidden from the 
casual observer, are instrumental in protecting the privacy of an AMS. They are 
used to scramble resource allocation mapping within assignment A-MAP control 
channels. The WiMAX network entry procedures are summarized in Figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34.   Network entry process (from [15] section 16.2.5.3.2) 
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III. SURVEY OF MAC CONTROL MESSAGES FOR 
VULNERABILITIES 
A. BACKGROUND 
MAC management messages are a key part of WiMAX control channels, 
and measures to protect these messages are examined in this chapter. An initial 
assessment is then performed to examine unprotected messages for 
weaknesses and to categorize them before examining selected examples in 
greater detail. This was performed for both legacy standards and IEEE 802.16m-
2011. 
B. PROTECTION MECHANISMS FOR MAC CONTROL MESSAGES 
1. Integrity Check Value (ICV)  
The ICV affords complete protection, including confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity. This form of protection was first introduced with IEEE 802.16m-
2011, and a majority of messages in that standard are protected in this manner 
compared with CMAC/HMAC, discussed below. In order for ICV to be used, 
security association needs to be established, which involves authentication as 
well as key exchange. This means that messages that normally receive 
protection do not during network entry prior to PKM negotiation. ICV protection is 
based upon the AES encryption scheme, which is currently regarded as secure 
and effective. 
2. CMAC and HMAC 
 CMAC and HMAC provide protection for integrity and authenticity only. 
Although messages protected are still in plain, a hash generated from the 
encryption key is sent with the message and any attempt to alter contents results 
in the message failing authentication at the receiver. Even if the attacker 
attempts to replace the entire message, he would face the problem of generating 
a hash that can pass authentication procedures at the receiver, as he does not 
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have the encryption key. Similar to ICV, protection requires security association 
to be completed. This means that messages that normally receive protection do 
not, prior to PKM negotiation.  
C. CLASSIFICATION OF MAC MESSAGES BASED ON PROTECTION 
AND VULNERABILITIES 
Based on the above criteria, the full list of MAC control messages for both 
IEEE 802.16m-2011 and IEEE 802.16-2009 were evaluated. 
1. IEEE 802.16m-2011 MAC Management Messages 
Out of 70 messages in total, 37 were fully protected by ICV. Nine were 
partially protected. Partial protection means that there are scenarios under which 
security association was not complete and MAC messages were not protected. 
The remaining 24 MAC messages were not protected. As the ICV protection is 
deemed effective, we regard messages under full ICV protection to be free from 
exploitation. A breakdown of the protection level for MAC management 
messages is provided in Table 4. 







For the MAC management messages that are not fully protected, the 
characteristics and workings of each message are examined in detail to ascertain 









As discussed earlier, due to the scrambling of assignment A-MAP by IEEE 
802.16m, unicast messages cannot be exploited. Hence, remaining messages 
are further categorized according to attack nature and functional groups (see 
Table 6).  
Table 6.   Exploitation summary of IEEE 802.16m MAC control messages  








The details of the above exploits are discussed in the following 
subsections, with emphasis on selected categories of attacks. Most of the 
vulnerabilities identified involve injecting spoofed MAC control messages to the 
ABS or the AMS.  
2. IEEE 802.16-2009 MAC Management Messages 
A similar process is carried out for IEEE 802.16-2009. Out of 71 
messages in total, nine are reserved, leaving 62 possible messages. Out of 
these 62, 30 are authenticated by CMAC/HMAC, leaving 32 that are both in plain 
and unauthenticated. A breakdown of the protection level for MAC management 
messages is provided in Table 7. 
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As the CMAC/HMAC protection is deemed effective, we regard messages 
protected as such to be free from exploitation as well as any modifications. For 
the MAC management messages that are not fully protected, we examined the 
characteristics and workings of each message in detail to ascertain possible 
exploitations. A summary of this assessment is provided in Table 8. 





The messages in Table 8 are then further categorized according to attack 
nature as well as functional group; they are listed in Table 9. A further distinction 
is made between vulnerabilities that have been previously identified in literature 
and those that have not. 
The details of the preceding exploits are discussed in the next chapter, 
with emphasis on selected categories of attack. Most of the vulnerabilities 











Table 9.   Exploitation summary of IEEE 802.16-2009 MAC control messages 






General Message Modification Attacks  3 5  8 
Power Related Message Modification 
Attacks  1 0  1 
MIMO Related Message Modification 
Attacks  0 1  1 
Flooding Attacks  0 2  2 
Water Torture Attacks  1 1  2 
ARQ  1 2  3 
AAS  0 1  1 
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IV. SPOOFING AND INJECTING CONTROL MESSAGES IN A 
TDMA REGIME 
A. BACKGROUND 
Most vulnerabilities involve an intruding station (IS) spoofing false MAC 
management messages at the ABS or an AMS. In contention based wireless 
standards such as IEEE 802.11 (Wifi), knowing the frequency and key 
parameters is sufficient for an attacker to start injecting messages. The TDMA 
and OFDMA nature of WiMAX means that in addition to knowing normal 
parameters, transmitting on the correct subcarriers and correct timing is also 
crucial. Most of the literature discusses vulnerabilities of MAC management 
messages, assuming they can be injected successfully without discussing 
details. Boom correctly identifies the single biggest challenge to mounting attacks 
on TDMA systems as timing [12]. 
In this chapter, we examine in detail the challenges and propose solutions 
to injecting MAC management messages, both at ABS and AMS. This material 
aims to give us some assurance that injection of messages at the physical level 
is feasible before MAC level attacks are discussed in the next chapter.  
B. PREPARATION 
1. Downlink Synchronization  
Just like any other legitimate AMS joining a network, our IS needs to 
detect ABS transmission, acquire key system parameters, and perform downlink 
synchronization. This enables the IS to properly receive, demodulate, and 
interpret data transmitted by the ABS. For IEEE 802.16m, key steps include 
reading key parameters off the PA-Preamble and SA-Preamble and achieving 





Figure 35.   IEEE 802.16m frame with locations of PA-preamble and SA-
preamble (From [14]). 
As for legacy systems, key parameters need to be read from the preamble 
and time must be synchronized. The legacy WiMAX frame is illustrated in Figure 
36. 
2. Decode DL-MAP and UP-MAP and Eavesdrop on Control 
Traffic  
In order to know where all bursts are located, the IS needs to decode the 
downlink medium access protocol (DL-MAP) as well as uplink medium access 
protocol (UL-MAP). For IEEE 802.16m, this information resides within the 
assignment A-MAP, as described in section II.C.7. Only the MAPs for broadcast 
traffic are available in plain, while MAPs for unicast traffic have been scrambled 
with a sequence derived from the AMS’s STID and the MAPMask seed; both 
STID and the MAPMask seed were sent to each AMS through an encrypted 
channel during network entry (as described in section II.D). If an attacker is able 
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to overcome the scramble, the unicast assignment A-MAP is available. 
Otherwise, only broadcast assignment A-MAP is available and only broadcast 
messages can be monitored and exploited. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Legacy WiMAX frame (From [20]). 
For legacy systems, the IS should: read key parameters from the frame 
control header (FCH), read DL-MAP to know timing and subcarriers used for 
bursts destined for each AMS, and read UL-MAP to know timing and subcarriers 
used for bursts transmitted by each AMS due for the ABS (the start point and 
area described in terms of symbol and subchannels). In this case, both unicast 
and broadcast MAPs are in plain. Within the DL-MAP and UL-MAP, the CID is 
the primary index to indicate ownership of each information element within the 
legacy WiMAX frame [20]. One such example is illustrated in Figure 37. 
For both IEEE 802.16m and legacy systems, sub-channelization effects 
(as described in section II.C.3) also need to be taken into account, mapping 
logical resource units (LRUs) into physical resouce units (PRUs). 
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Once downlink synchronization and the decoding of MAPs are completed, 




Figure 37.   Example of data burst within legacy WiMAX frame (From [20]). 
3. Listen for MS Joining Network and Intercept Connection ID 
(CID) if Subject of Interest is Unicast Message 
In the case of legacy systems, the IS can listen for the CID issued by the 
BS to a joining MS through the relevant field within the RNG-RSP MAC 
management message sent from the BS to the MS as part of its joining process. 
The CID is important to identify the source and destination of messages, as well 
as to know which burst to target. For broadcast messages within both IEEE 
802.16m-2011 and legacy systems, STID or CID is not required. 
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4. Acquire and Monitor ARQ Parameters and Numbers 
Besides other parameters, the ARQ parameters in use are important; they 
allow the intruding system (IS) to properly formulate injected messages to ensure 
they are contextualized. The ARQ sequence number for each CID or broadcast 
message that we have an interest in needs to be tracked so that the sequence 
number in our injected message is acceptable.  
C. PURPOSE OF RANGING AND CHALLENGES OF INJECTING 
 MESSAGES WITHIN TDMA SYSTEMS 
1. Ranging in TDMA Systems 
Timing and burst allocation within the WiMAX frame is specifically 
assigned to each AMS within the UL-MAP and DL-MAP or assignment A-MAP. 
These timings are with reference to the ABS. This essentially means the timings 
meant for the commencement of transmission and reception are from the 
viewpoint of the ABS. For the downlink transmission, this means that propagation 
delays occur before reception at the AMS. The length of propagation delay is 
dependent on the distance of the AMS from the ABS. The AMS can achieve 
downlink synchronization through the pre-amble. Similarly, for the uplink, 
propagation delays occur between the time the AMS starts transmitting to the 
time the signal arrives at ABS. This arrival time needs to be referenced to the 
ABS’s timing. To achieve this, the AMS needs to advance the start of 
transmission by a period equivalent to the propagation delay. Ranging is the 
process of ascertaining as well as fine-tuning timing adjustment. The schematic 
explaining the need for timing adjustment is illustrated in Figure 38. The section 
on the left depicts a scenario without timing adjustment, while the section on the 
right shows how timing adjustment enables the frame transmitted by the MS to 
arrive at the expected timing at the BS. 
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Figure 38.   Ranging and timing adjust (From [21]). 
2. Challenges of Injecting Messages 
The challenge of injecting messages within a TDMA system lies in 
establishing the correct timing adjustment to commence transmission at our IS to 
ensure that the signal arrives at the intended slot allocated for the ABS or AMS. 
As a perpetuator, although we may be able to perform ranging to obtain a timing 
adjust for uplink attacks, we will not have the benefit of ranging for downlink 
attacks involving another AMS. If the location of the AMS we are targeting is 
unknown, the challenge is even greater. Existing literature either assumes that 
this can be done or acknowledges the challenges without discussing solutions. 
To have some certainty that the proposed MAC message based attacks can 
work, a series of possible measures to overcome these timing requirements are 
proposed for different scenarios. 
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D. INSERTION OF MAC CONTROL MESSAGES 
1. From Mobile Station to Base Station 
This scenario is for the case when we attempt to spoof a MAC message 
from an AMS to ABS on the uplink. For the case of IEEE 802.16m-2011, unless 
the STID and MAPMask seed constraints discussed earlier can be overcome, the 
unicast UL-MAP cannot be read from the assignment A-MAP, and the message 
cannot be inserted. Although broadcast A-MAP can still be read, there is no 
broadcast traffic for uplink. A schematic of the scenario is provided in Figure 39. 
In this example, the MS need to advance transmission timing by 4us for the 
packet to reach the BS at the expected timing. As the IS is farther away from the 
BS, it needs to advance the transmission of its spoofed packet by 5us to ensure 
it can arrive at the expected time. 
 
Figure 39.   Schematic and example of AMS to ABS scenario. 
a. Locate Target Uplink Burst from UL-MAP 
The IS first needs to ascertain the uplink burst location that is 
allocated to the AMS by the ABS for the current frame. In the case of legacy 
systems, this can be done by scanning the UL-MAP and looking for CIDs 
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b. Establish Uplink Timing Adjustment through Initial 
Ranging  
Once the target timing is ascertained, the IS needs to advance the 
transmission timing equivalent to the propagation delay between the IS and BS. 
In order to know how much to advance, the IS can perform an initial ranging (just 
as a normal AMS does to join the network) with the ABS. It does so by issuing an 
AAI-RNG-REQ (RNG-REQ for legacy systems) management message to the 
ABS on the ranging contention channel. The ABS performs measurements on 
the received signals and responds with timing and power adjust figures in AAI-
RNG-ACK. The initial ranging process is shown in Figure 40. An equivalent 
process exists for legacy systems, with CID issued instead of STID/TSTID.  
 
Figure 40.   Network entry process with initial ranging (from [15] section 
16.2.5.3.2). 
c. Transmit Injected MAC MSG 
The IS can then formulate the MAC management message, 
encapsulate it with a generic MAC header (GMH) and CRC at the tail (optional) 
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to form a MAC management frame, and transmit it with a timing adjustment so 
that it will arrive at the same slot as the burst destined for the targeted AMS. The 
injected MAC frame has to commence at the very beginning of the traffic burst. 
This is preferred to injecting into the middle of a burst as to do that, the attack 
must know the contents of the burst before and after the injected symbols. To 
ensure that our signal can drown out that of the targeted AMS at the ABS, the IS 
has to transmit at a power higher than the resultant figure after incorporating the 
power adjustment figure from ABS. The transmit power level is discussed in a 
subsequent section. 
d. Verify Effectiveness of Attack 
The IS can then monitor traffic from the ABS and AMS to determine 
if the attack was successful.  
e. ARQ Considerations 
The implications of the ARQ mode as well as parameters in-force 
have to be considered when formulating the MAC message and encapsulating 
frame. Assuming the timing is correct and the frame is decoded at the ABS, in 
order for the MAC management message to be accepted, we have to meet ARQ 
conditions. This means that CRC checks have to pass and that the whole ARQ 
block containing our MAC management message has to be assessed by the 
ABS as intact. Otherwise, this frame could be discarded and a retransmit request 
sent out to the targeted MS. At some point after we stop our transmission and the 
signal from targeted AMS starts to be received by the ABS, CRC will fail and the 
ARQ will trigger, but this failed block must not contain our MAC management 
message. This essentially means that our injected message(s) and frame have to 
be sufficiently long (See Figure 41). The ARQ sequence number also needs to 














Figure 41.   Ensuring injected content span across ARQ block. 
f. Transmit Power 
Due to the TDMA nature of WiMAX, our injected MAC message 
has to arrive at the victim’s location at approximately the same time as the 
genuine signal. For our signal to override the genuine one, our signal strength 
needs to be higher. With power adjustment results obtained from the ranging 
process, the IS will know what transmission power to use to result in a nominal 
signal power at the ABS. This is computed by applying the power adjust figure 
(PAdjust) to the power transmitted (PTX) for the ranging (PInitial_Ranging). It is further 
proposed that an overpower gain (Goverpower) dependent on the modulation 
scheme be applied to transmission power. This overpowering gain is set 
according to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) requirement of the respective 
modulation scheme. The above computations are defined by  
PTX (dB) = PInitial_Ranging + PAdjust+Goverpower.    (1) 
The net effect that we desire to achieve is to force the victim’s 
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appear as noise in comparison to our signal while meeting requirements for SNR 
for the modulation scheme in use. 
2. From Base Station to Mobile Station 
This scenario is for the case where we attempt to spoof a MAC message 
from an ABS to AMS on the downlink. For the case of IEEE 802.16m-2011, 
unless the STID and MAPMask seed constraints as discussed earlier can be 
overcome, the unicast UL-MAP cannot be read from the assignment A-MAP and 
the message cannot be inserted. Broadcast A-MAP can still be read, and 
broadcast traffic can apply for downlink. The same basic principles and 
challenges from AMS to ABS scenario apply for the ABS to AMS scenario, but 
additional challenges emerge. In the previous scenario, signal injection was from 
IS to ABS, whereas in this scenario, our IS needs to inject signals to an AMS that 
is mobile, and its location may be unknown. To make matters worse, ranging 
cannot be carried out to ascertain distance and propagation delay, or power. The 
following discussion is set for two sub-scenarios: MS location known and MS 
location unknown. 
a. Mobile Station Location Known 
If the location of the mobile station that we plan to inject a message 
into is known, the timing adjustment required can be accurately estimated. A 
schematic of an ABS to AMS scenario with AMS position known is provided in 
Figure 42, which incorporates an example of how the location can be used to 
translate into propagation timings and how timing adjustments can be formulated. 
i. Locate Targeted Downlink Burst from DL-MAP. The 
IS first needs to ascertain the downlink burst location allocated by the ABS to 
transmit to AMS for the current frame. This can be done by scanning the 






Figure 42.   Schematic and example of ABS to AMS scenario. 
ii. Compute Downlink Timing Adjust. Once the targeted 
timing with reference to ABS is ascertained, the IS needs to advance or delay 
transmission timing. The IS can compute a timing adjustment by computing the 
distance between ABS and AMS and between IS and AMS. The difference in 
distance, converted to the corresponding timing, is the timing adjustment. 
 
iii. Transmit Injected MAC MSG. The IS can then 
formulate the MAC management message, encapsulate it with a GMH and CRC 
at the tail (optional) to form a MAC management frame, and transmit it with 
timing adjustment so that it arrives at the slot destined for the targeted AMS. The 
injected MAC frame has to commence at the very beginning of the traffic burst. 
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iv. Verify Effectiveness of Attack. The IS can then 
monitor traffic from the ABS and AMS to determine if the attack was successful. 
 
v. ARQ Considerations. The implications of the ARQ 
mode and parameters in force have to be considered when formulating the MAC 
message and encapsulating frame. Assuming the timing is correct and the frame 
is decoded at the AMS, for the MAC management message to be accepted, we 
have to meet ARQ conditions. This means that CRC checks have to pass and 
that the whole ARQ block containing our MAC management message has to be 
assessed by the AMS as intact. Otherwise, this frame could be discarded and a 
retransmit request sent out to the ABS. At some point after we stop our 
transmission and the signal from ABS starts to be received by the AMS, CRC will 
fail and ARQ will trigger, but this failed block must not contain our MAC 
management message. This essentially means that our injected message(s) and 
frame have to be sufficiently long. The ARQ sequence number also needs to 
continue from the last sequence number used during the previous burst. 
  
vi. Uncertainty Analysis. As no ranging was performed, 
the timing adjustment is worked out using the GPS coordinates of the ABS, IS, 
and AMS. These position estimates have their own tolerances. Hence, an 
analysis is carried out to confirm timing margins and the feasibility of success. 
For a commonly adopted configuration, the OFDMA symbol duration is 91.4 us, 
preceded with a guard interval (tGI) of 11.4 us, padded with a cyclic prefix. Timing 























As seen from the computation, after taking into account the 
positional uncertainty (from the GPS position uncertainty [22]) of the ABS, AMS, 
and IS, as well as the channel spread, we have a margin of 7.35 us (see Figure 
43). Hence, a foreseeable timing error of a frame injection at the beginning of a 
burst is not major factor as this error is less than the difference between the 




Figure 43.   Illustration of timing uncertainty vs guard interval. 
vii. Transmission Power. Due to the TDMA nature of 
WiMAX, our injected MAC message has to arrive at the victim’s location at 
approximately the same time as the genuine signal. For our signal to override the 
genuine one, its signal strength needs to be higher. The approach taken to 
estimate the transmission power for this scenario is different. The IS will measure 
incident power from the ABS (PABS(incident)). With the distance from the ABS to IS 
known, the path loss (LABS-IS) can be estimated, and hence, transmission power 








AMS known, path loss (LABS-AMS) can be estimated. Hence, the estimated 
transmission power by the ABS incident upon the targeted AMS can be obtained. 
Next, the path loss between the IS and AMS (LIS-AMS) needs to be factored in. It is 
also proposed that an overpower gain (Goverpower) which is dependent on the 
modulation scheme be applied to the transmission power. This overpower gain is 
set according to the SNR requirement of the respective modulation scheme. 
Hence, the proposed transmission power is computed according to  
PTX (dB) = PABS(incident) + LABS-IS – LABS-AMS + LIS-AMS + Goverpower.  (2) 
The desired net effect of the proposed transmission power is 
to force the victim’s automatic gain control to reduce gain and render the genuine 
source’s transmission to appear as noise in comparison to our signal while 
meeting the SNR requirements for the modulation scheme in use.  
b. Mobile Station Location Unknown 
If the location of the mobile station that we plan to inject a message 
into is unknown, we can attempt transmission of the injected message over 
multiple attempts over a selected range which is bounded by the cell dimension. 
A schematic showing an ABS-to-AMS scenario with MS position unknown and 
cell size of 5 km is provided in Figure 44. As shown in the figure, there are two 
extreme scenarios in terms of the distance from the AMS to IS. The AMS and IS 
could be at the edge of the cell (far case) or right next to each other (near case).  
i. Locate Target Downlink Burst from DL-MAP. The IS 
first needs to ascertain the downlink burst location allocated by the ABS to 
transmit to the AMS for the current frame. This can be done by scanning the 
assignment A-MAP or DL-MAP for slots allocated for the ABS to transmit to the 





Figure 44.   Example illustrating a scenario of injection to MS with unknown 
position. 
ii. Compute Downlink Timing Adjust. Once the target 
timing is ascertained, the IS needs to compute the possible ranges for the timing 
adjust to attempt. Let tprop(max) be the propagation delay for the worst case 
whereby the IS and AMS are at the extreme ends of the cell (far case in Figure 
44). For the far case, the timing needs to be advanced by half of tprop(max). This 
ensures that the injected signal has sufficient time to propagate across the cell 
and arrive at the AMS at approximately the same time as the signal from ABS. 
For the near case, the timing needs to be delayed by half of tprop(max). This is 
because the signal transmitted to the AMS takes that length of time to propagate 
to the edge of the cell. For different positioning of the AMS and IS, the timing 
adjustment will vary between the two extreme cases (far and near cases) For 
different positioning of the AMS and IS, the timing adjustments will vary between 
the two extreme cases. The above concepts are illustrated in Figure 45. 


















Figure 45.    Illustration of implication of unknown AMS location on transmit 
timing. 
Once the range of possible timings has been computed, the 
next step is to divide the range into intervals with each interval being tGI/2 where 
tGI is the duration of the guard interval. How the possible timing range and 
intervals can be selected around the expected timing of the burst 
commencement is illustrated in Figure 46. This expected timing should be 
referenced to the BS (timing at IS minus propagation delay from ABS to IS). The 
central idea is to attempt injection at different times within the range, selecting 
one interval per frame until the timing falls within the actual guard interval and the 
MAC message is accepted. An interval of tGI/2 ensures that the IS will not 
inadvertently skip over the actual guard band. The IS can measure the incident 
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estimate the distance of AMS from IS by assuming path loss using the free-
space model. With this estimated distance, the IS can select a better timing 




Figure 46.   Example of MAC message injection plan. 
 
iii. Transmit Injected MAC MSG. The IS can then 
formulate the MAC management message, encapsulate it with a GMH and CRC 
at the tail (optional) to form a MAC management frame, and transmit it with a 
timing adjustment so that it arrives at the same slot destined for the targeted 
AMS. The injected MAC frame has to commence at the very beginning of the 
traffic burst. This is to minimize the amount of context we will need to deal with if 
we inject mid-frame.  
 
iv. Verify Effectiveness of Attack. After the attempted 
injection of a MAC message at one of the intervals within the range, the IS can 
monitor traffic from the ABS and AMS during the next frame to determine if the 
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v. ARQ Considerations. As in the above scenarios, the 
implications of the ARQ mode and the parameters in-force have to be considered 
when formulating the MAC message and encapsulating frame. Assuming the 
timing is correct and the frame is decoded at the victim, for the MAC 
management message to be accepted, we have to meet ARQ conditions. This 
means that CRC checks have to pass and that the whole ARQ block containing 
our MAC management message has to be assessed by the victim as intact. 
Otherwise, this frame could be discarded and a retransmit request sent out to the 
source. At some point after we stop our transmission and the signal from the 
source starts to be received by the victim, the CRC will fail and the ARQ will 
trigger, but this failed block must not contain our MAC management message. 
This essentially means that our injected message(s) and frame have to be 
sufficiently long. The ARQ sequence number also needs to continue from the last 
sequence number used during the previous burst. 
 
vi. Transmission Power. Due to the TDMA nature of 
WiMAX, our injected MAC message has to arrive at the victim’s location at 
approximately the same time as the genuine signal. For our signal to override the 
genuine one, our signal strength needs to be higher. The approach taken to 
estimate the transmission power for this scenario is different, as the distances 
between AMS and IS and between ABS and AMS are unknown. In this case, the 
path loss between the IS and targeted AMS (LIS-AMS) is estimated since the 
distance is unknown. The distance between the ABS and IS as well as the 
incident ABS power (PABS(incident)) measured at the IS are used to estimate the 
transmission power of the ABS. Since the distance between the ABS and AMS is 
unknown, the worst case is assumed where the AMS is co-located with ABS. 
Therefore, full ABS transmission power is incident upon the AMS (where the 
LABS-AMS term in Equation (2) is zero in this scenario). Thus, the ABS 
transmission power, together with the path loss associated with the timing 
currently being attempted, is used to compute the IS transmission power (PTX). It 
is also proposed that an overpower gain (Goverpower), which is dependent on the 
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modulation scheme in-use, be applied to the transmission power. This overpower 
gain is set according to the SNR requirement of the respective modulation 
scheme. The proposed transmission power is calculated according to the 
following:  
PTX (dB) = PABS(incident) + LABS-IS + LIS-AMS + Goverpower.  (3) 
The desired net effect of the proposed transmission power is 
to force the victim’s automatic gain control to reduce gain and render the genuine 
source’s transmission to appear as noise in comparison to our signal while 




V. ATTACKS BASED ON MANIPULATION OF UPLINK 
TRANSMISSION POWER WITH IEEE 802.16M-2011 
A. BACKGROUND 
Having proposed the means to inject MAC management messages, we 
proceed to discuss a class of attack which involves the injection of messages to 
manipulate the uplink power control of AMSs within a WiMAX cell. Proper power 
management is vital to the correct operation of a WiMAX cell. Low transmission 
power results in high bit error rates or no reception. Excessively high 
transmission power also results in interference to nearby cells using the same set 
of frequencies. Both effects are disruptive to the targeted network’s operations. 
Depending on the selected attack vectors, the effects could be surgical and 
covert, targeting a single AMS, or blanket, disrupting all nodes within a cell. IEEE 
802.16m-2011 power related attacks are addressed in this chapter. Those for 
legacy systems are addressed in a later chapter. 
B. UPLINK POWER CONTROL 
Overall network uplink power control can be summarized from [15] section 
16.3.8.4 in Figure 47. 
In Figure 47, there are three stages in uplink power control, initial network 
entry, normal network operations, and handover.  In the following subsections, an 
overview of their functionalities is given which provide the background to 






Figure 47.   Summary of uplink power control. 
1. Power Control during Initial Ranging  
As discussed previously, an AMS attempting to join a network first 
performs downlink synchronization, which includes reading system parameters 
from the preamble, superframe headers, assignment A-MAPs, or UL-MAP and 
DL-MAP. The AMS then attempts to perform uplink synchronization, which 
includes initial ranging. The received signal strength (RSS) from ABS is first 
measured, and this figure is added to EIRxPIR,min and BS_EIRP, which are 
parameters present in SS-SFH SP2 and SP1, to obtain the initial transmission 
power that the AMS will use to transmit the initial ranging preamble to the ABS. 
This initial transmission power is calculated from  
_ _ ,min _TX IR MIN IRP EIRxPI BS EIRP RSS   .   (4) 
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Should the ranging operation be successful, the ABS provides power 
adjustment figures to the AMS through the power level adjustment (or PRNG-ACK) 
parameter within the AAI-RNG-ACK MAC management message. After N times 
of ramping up and m times of receiving AAI-RNG-ACK, the final initial ranging 
transmission power (PTX_IR_Final) is 
 ( )_ _ _ __ , mTX IR Final TX IR MIN IR Step RNG ACKP P N P P          (5) 
where PIR,Step is defined in IEEE 802.11m-2001 standard as 2 dB. 
Hence, OffsetInitial is defined as 
              
_ _ ( )
10 log10( )
Initial TX IR Final InitialRangingOffset P L SINR NI
RangingSubcarrierNum
   
           (6) 
where L is the estimated average DL propagation loss calculated by AMS; NI is 
the estimated average noise and interference power per subcarrier at ABS as 
indicated by AAI-ULPC-NI message; and SINRInitialRanging is defined as  
SINRInitialRanging = offsetControl + targetInitialRangingSinr  (7) 
where offsetControl is obtained from A-MAP Information Element (IE) and 
targetInitialRangingSinr is defined in Table 946 in IEEE 802.16m-2011 standard. 
2. Power Control during Network Entry and Normal Operations  
After completion of initial ranging, NI and offsetControl are set as 
instructed by ABS through A-MAP. Other UL power control parameters are set to 
defaults as defined in Table 947 in IEEE 802.16m-2011 standard. 
During normal operations, UL transmission power level is controlled by 
 T L Tgt NI offsetP P SINR P P                                      (8) 
where PL, SINRTgt, PNI and Poffset are defined and illustrated in Figure 48. 
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Figure 48.   Equation for MS uplink transmission power. 
While this general equation holds true, different sets of Poffset and SINRTgt 
values exist for different channels (e.g. control, data, and ranging channels).  
There are two types of Poffset that are controlled by the ABS through the 
AAI-UL-POWER-ADJUST message: OffsetControl and OffsetData. The OffsetControl 
parameter governs the control channels and is defined as 
OffsetControl = OffsetInitial  (discussed in previous section) + offsetControl 
(parameter in AAI-UL-POWER-ADJUST message)                   (9) 
 
while the OffsetData parameter is used for data channels and is defined as 
OffsetData = OffsetInitial. 
 
There are two types of SINRtgt; one governs the control channels and is  
supplied by the ABS through the AAI-SCD message, and the other one governs 
the data channels values and is defined in by 
 min10 log[max( , )] 10 log( )tgt DL streamSINR SINR SIR n      (10) 
where SINRtgt, SINRmin,  , SIRDL, and   are defined and illustrated in 
Figure 49. The   value is a masking parameter set to zero or one for excluding 
or including the effects of nstream where nstream is the number of streams in the 
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Figure 49.   Equation for SINRtgt in uplink transmission power. 
3. Power Control during Handover 
During handover of an AMS from cell to cell, an AAI-HO-CMD message is 
received by the AMS. Within the message, the CDMA_RNG_FLAG indicates if it 
is necessary to conduct ranging. If CDMA_RNG_FLAG = 0, offsetData and 
offsetControl are provided within the message. 
C. MANIPULATION OF POWER CONTROL 
In the following subsections, possible approaches to manipulate the uplink 
transmit power of AMSs are discussed. 
1. Manipulate PNI for Entire Cell Through AAI-ULPC-NI  
To reiterate, the transmission power at the AMS is governed by 
Equation (8).  
One possible attack of uplink power management is to inject an AAI-
ULPC-NI message with a small or large NI value. If a low value is injected, the 
SNR at ABS drops. Should the drop be large enough to cause the SNR to fall 
below the requirement for the modulation scheme in use, the bit error rate 
increases or reception may be eliminated altogether. If a large NI value is 
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injected, the large signal strength may increase interference with cells in the 
vicinity using the same frequencies.  
Although a single strong emission may not be a major problem for other 
cells, bear in mind that this message is broadcast and all AMSs within the cell 
may be affected under the right conditions, thus, greatly multiplying the effect. 
The parameter NI is defined as  
 
where PTN is the thermal noise power density at zero Celsius, which has a value 
of 174.2  dBm, and Δf is the subcarrier spacing (Hz), and IoT corresponds to 
gammaIotFp0, which is defined in Table 11. 
To change the power, the gammalotFp0 field within AAI-ULPC-NI can be 
modified; it can be varied from 0 to 63.5 dB in 0.5 dB steps, which represent a 
dynamic range of 2.23x106. Details on this field are provided in Table 11. Both 
control and data channels are affected by this manipulation. 




AAI-ULPC-NI is a broadcast message, and all AMSs within the cell served 
by the ABS may be affected. Although all AMSs can potentially be affected, the 
timing adjustment from the IS to individual AMS also needs to be correct for the 
AMS to take in the broadcast correctly. The challenges brought about by 
differences in timing precipitated by the distance between the IS and ABS are 
illustrated in Figure 50. A broadcast signal (by IS) reaches AMSs over different 
locations at different times from a broadcast signal sent from the real ABS.  
NI = PTN + IoT + 10log10(Δf) (11) 
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Figure 50.   Timing differences for different AMS during broadcast message 
manipulation. 
This might mean that if multiple AMSs within the cell need to be targeted, 
the spoofed message may need to be sent out repeatedly over several frames 
within a range of timing adjustments. Alternatively, the closer the IS is to the 
ABS, the smaller the maximum timing difference is. It is estimated that if the 
distance between the ABS and IS is within the distance equivalent to a 
propagation delay of one Cyclic Prefix (CP) (i.e.,11.42 us, which is equivalent to 
3426 m), no timing adjustment is needed in order to affect all AMSs within the 
whole cell. 
2. Manipulate Poffset For Single AMS through AAI-UL-POWER-
ADJUST 
To reiterate, the transmission power of an AMS is governed by Equation 
(8). Another possible attack of uplink power management is to inject an AAI-UL-
POWER-ADJUST message with a low or high offsetData or offsetControl value. 
If a low value is injected, the SNR at ABS drops. Should the drop be large 
enough to cause the SNR to fall below that required for the modulation scheme, 
the bit error rate will increase or reception may be eliminated altogether. If a high 
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cells in the vicinity using the same frequencies. However, since this is a unicast 
message, only one AMS is affected by the message inject, and a single strong 
emission may not be a major problem for other cells. To cause a larger impact on 
other cells, multiple AMSs may need to be manipulated to multiply the effect.  
The offsetData and offsetControl fields in the AAI-UL-POWER-ADJUST 
message can be varied from -15.5 to 16 dB in 0.5 dB steps, which represents a 
dynamic range of 2.23x106. Details on this field are provided in Table 12. 











As discussed earlier, AAI-UL-POWER-ADJUST is a unicast message and 
only a single AMS will be affected per successful message injection. Offset 
values for control and data channels can be individually set, meaning that the 
data channel can be selectively targeted while leaving the control channels 
alone. This approach can disrupt network operations while making detection 
more difficult, as the affected AMS will appear to be functioning normally, 
because it is still responding to on the control channels. 
For IEEE 802.16m, challenges still exist. Since AAI-UL-POWER-ADJUST 
is a unicast message, its A-MAP is scrambled as described in Sections II.C.7 and  
II.B.1. It is not readily accessible unless an algorithm is developed to overcome 
the scramble. Hence, injecting an AAI-UL-POWER-ADJUST poses a significant 
challenge as of now. 
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3. Manipulate SINRtgt  
To reiterate, transmission power at the AMS is governed by Equation (8). 
Another possible attack of uplink power management is to manipulate SNRtgt by 
injecting an AAI-SCD message. The SINRtgt parameter is defined in Equation 
(10). Details for three of the parameters in this equation are provided in Table 13. 

















a. Manipulating dataSinrMin through AAI-SCD 
 With reference to Equation (10), it is possible to manipulate SINRtgt 
by spoofing AAI-SCD with an amended dataSinrMin. However, due to the 
maximum function built into the equation, there is no effect if the other term is 
higher than the new dataSinrMin. 
b. Manipulating gammaIotFpx through AAI-SCD 
With reference to Equation (10), it is possible to manipulate SINRtgt 
by spoofing AAI-SCD with an amended gammaIotFpx. However, due to the 
maximum function built into the equation, there is no effect if the other term is 
higher than the new value. 
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c. Manipulating alpha through AAI-SCD 
With reference to Equation (10), SINRtgt can be manipulated by 
amending alpha within AAI-SCD. However, due to the maximum function built 
into the equation, there is no effect if the other term is higher than the new value. 
4. Holistic Analysis of Power-Manipulation Options 
A summary of power-related attacks is provided in Table 14. The analysis 
below compares the three key attack approaches: 
a. Effect of Impact 
The three approaches can achieve varying degrees of dynamic 
range, from 63.5 dB for NI within AAI-ULPC-NI to a factor of 1.5 for gammaIotFp 
in AAI-SCD. A higher dynamic range is desirable as this results in a more 
pronounced impact. Comparisons are shown in the Power Control Range column 
in Table 14. From the perspective of maximum impact, the approach involving 
the manipulation of PNI is the most desirable. 
b. Ease of Attack 
Similarly, the three approaches have varying degrees of ease of 
execution, ranging from a simple and short MAC management message injection 
(for a message body of less than 50 bits) for manipulating PNI within the AAI-
ULPC-NI message to a moderately long (more than 200 bits) MAC management 
message modification when Poffset is manipulated through gammaIotFp in AAI-
SCD. Longer message injection require reading in and formulating a larger 
numbers of parameters, thus, increasing complexity. Aside from this, the 
approach for manipulating Poffset also involves dependencies where manipulation 
of one single parameter is not sufficient and multiple manipulations need to be 
done to achieve results. Comparisons of the three approaches are shown in the 
“Length of Inject MSG”, and “Execution Dependencies” columns in Table 14. In 
addition, the current challenges associated with injecting unicast messages make 
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the option of manipulating offsetData and offsetControl parameters difficult. From 
the perspective of ease of attack, the approach involving the manipulation of PNI 
is the most desirable. 
c. Scope of Effects and Signature 
Attacks manipulating the NI field in the AAI-ULPC-NI message 
results in a widespread impact since the message is a broadcast. Either all AMSs 
within the cell could lose communications or all AMSs will transmit at excessively 
high power, causing interference to neighboring cells using the same set of 
frequencies. On the other hand, manipulating Offset is a surgical attack targeted 
at one AMS. Hence, depending on the context and the intent of the attack, both 
options serve different needs. Of course, the surgical option is subject to 
overcoming assignment A-MAP scrambling, as discussed earlier. 
 80
Table 14.   Comparison of three approaches to disrupt uplink power control. 
















































































Favorable Neutral Unfavorable 
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VI. OTHER ATTACKS WITH IEEE 802.16M-2011 
As noted, IEEE 802.26m-2011 is a relatively new standard that is 
substantially different from legacy standards and warrants a reinvestigation not 
only new vulnerabilities but also whether old vulnerabilities found and fixed in 
legacy standards have reemerged. The remaining possible vulnerabilities 
identified within IEEE 802.16m-2011 are examined in this chapter. 
A. MIMO RELATED ATTACKS 
1. System Configuration Descriptor (AAI-SCD) 
This management message is transmitted by the ABS at a periodic 
interval to define a system configuration. By spoofing the AAI-SCD message with 
a false alpha parameter (indicating the number of receive antennas), an AMS 
attempting to join a network can possibly be confused as to the actual number of 
receive antennas on the ABS and adopt the wrong MIMO scheme as well as 
parameters and codes, disrupting communications. Besides changing the alpha 
parameter, “Configuration Change Count” in the AAI-SCD also needs to be 
incremented by 1 modulo 16 whenever the contents of this message are 
changed. This is to ensure that the AMS parses and interprets the whole AAI-
SCD message. The AMS normally ignores the rest of the message the moment it 
sees that “Configuration Change Count” is the same as previously received. This 
attack vector was developed from an understanding of the IEEE standard [15], 
section 16.2.3.31. 
2. Basic Capability Request and Response (AAI-SBC-REQ and 
AAI-SBC-RSP) 
AAI-SBC-REQ is transmitted by an AMS that is attempting to enter the 
network. It contains the maximum "capability class" that the AMS can support. 
Upon receiving the AAI-SBC-REQ management message, the ABS informs AMS 
the capability class to adopt through the AAI-SBC-RSP management message. 
One attack vector that may adversely affect MIMO performance involves 
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spoofing the AAI-SBC-REQ message during initial network entry, indicating a low 
or erroneous figure for the following parameters: “Maximum number of streams 
for Single-User MIMO (SU-MIMO) in DL MIMO”, “Maximum number of streams 
for CL multi-user MIMO (MU-MIMO) in AMS point of view in DL MIMO”, “DL 
MIMO mode”, and “Number of Tx Antenna of AMS.” 
This is expected to either cause the ABS to issue an AAI-SBC-RSP 
message with instructions to the AMS for a MIMO mode below the capability of 
the AMS or to disrupt communications, due to mode and parameter mismatch. 
Alternatively, an attacker can issue an AAI_SBC-RSP management 
message with MIMO settings that do not match those requested by AMS. As a 
result, a mismatch in parameters between the ABS and AMS can arise, which 
disrupts communications. This attack vector was developed from an 
understanding of the IEEE standard [15], Sections 16.2.3.5 and 16.2.3.6. 
B. FLOODING ATTACKS 
1. Ranging Request (AAI-RNG-REQ) 
This possible attack involves repeated transmission of AAI-RNG-REQ 
messages that can tie up ABS resources and deny entry for legitimate AMSs. 
The attack is possible because the message is unprotected by either ICV or 
CMAC. The constraint imposed by the STID and MAPMask seed does not apply 
to this message, as it is sent over the code-division multiple access (CDMA) 
channel allocated to the AMS during ranging and network entry. This attack 
vector was developed after investigating the IEEE standard [15], Section 16.2.3. 
2. Reset Command (AAI-RES-CMD) 
This message forces an AMS to reset itself, reinitialize its MAC and repeat 
initial system access. This message was previously identified as a vulnerability, 
and authentication was added to protect it. However, this protection merely 
restricts the window of application from any time, previously, to during the 
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network entry process. By identifying this window through analysis, this message 
can still be injected to deny network access for a legitimate AMS. 
The window of opportunity is identified to be after completion of the 
ranging process (AMS is issued with TSTID) and before establishment of a 
security association (after which all messages are encrypted and authenticated). 
This window is illustrated in Figure 53. 
 
Figure 51.   AAI-RES-CMD insertion window (After [15] section 16.2.5.3.2).                                 
The constraint imposed by the STID and MAPMask seed does not apply 
in this case because during the above window of opportunity, the security 
association is not ready and the system is still using the TSTID and MAPMask 
seed issued by the AAI-RNG-RSP message. The AAI-RNG-RSP message is not 
encrypted at this stage, and, thus, the TSTID and MAPMask seed are available 
to an attacker. They are replaced later by STID and a new MAPMask seed via 
the AAI-REG-RSP message in encrypted form. This attack vector was developed 








C. WATER TORTURE ATTACKS 
1. Traffic Indicator (AAI-TRF-IND) 
AMSs can enter the sleep mode to conserve power with an assigned 
SLPID (sleep ID). Sleeping AMSs are allocated listening windows so they can 
wake up momentarily to listen for messages destined for them. An AAI-TRF-IND 
message is a broadcast message sent by one ABS to indicate to a group of 
AMSs with the same SLPID that downlink traffic for them is present (see Figure 
54 for an illustration of sleep mode operation). With a negative indication of 
downlink traffic, the AMS returns to sleep for the rest of the listening cycle, saving 
power. With a positive indication of downlink traffic, the AMS remains awake 
during the rest of its listening cycle. By repeatedly spoofing the message with a 
positive indication, an attacker can increase battery drain on AMSs within the 
cell. This vulnerability has been identified in legacy systems in [5], [7], and [8]. 
This vulnerability is analyzed to be still present within IEEE 802.16m-2011. The 
constraint imposed by the STID and MAPMask seed does not apply to this 
message, because it is a broadcast message. This attack vector was verified 























2.  BS Paging Advertisement (AAI-PAG-ADV) 
As illustrated in Figure 55, AMSs can enter an idle state from the 
connected state to conserve power and can be in paging-available or paging-
unavailable mode. AAI-PAG-ADV is used to page AMSs within a paging group, 
with an “action code” in the message to indicating that the devices need to 
conduct network reentry or perform ranging to update the ABS of their locations. 
AAI-PAG-ADV can be sent to force AMSs to reenter the network and hence 
increase battery drain. 
The constraint imposed by the STID and MAPMask seed does not apply 
in this case, because this is a broadcast message. This attack vector was 
developed after investigating the IEEE standard, [15] Sections 16.2.3.23 and 
16.2.3. 
 
Figure 53.   Illustration of operating modes within idle state (After [14]). 
D.  OTHER GENERAL MESSAGE MODIFICATION ATTACKS 
1. Ranging Response (AAI-RNG-RSP) 
AAI-RNG-RSP management message is transmitted by ABS in response 
to the AAI-RNG-REQ message. It can also be transmitted asynchronously to 
send corrections after measurements are calculated based on other received 
data/traffic. One attack vector proposed by Blair [11] is to spoof the message 
during initial network entry with the abort flag set. This is expected to cause 
Paging Available 
mode 










ranging to be aborted and the network entry to fail. This attack vector was 
verified after investigating the IEEE standard [15], Sections 16.2.3.2 and 16.2.3. 
2. Ranging Acknowledge (AAI-RNG-ACK) 
The AAI-RNG-ACK message is sent by the ABS in response to the 
ranging request during initial ranging to provide timing, power, and frequency 
adjustments to the AMS. A possible attack vector is to spoof this message, thus, 
disrupting network entry of the AMS since the parameters are wrong. This attack 
vector was developed after investigating the IEEE standard [15], Sections 
16.2.3.3 and 16.2.3. 
3. Basic Capability Request and Response (AAI-SBC-REQ and 
AAI-SBC-RSP) 
AAI-SBC-REQ is transmitted by an AMS which is attempting to enter the 
network; it contains the maximum "capability class" that the MS can support. 
Upon receiving the AAI-SBC-REQ management message, the ABS informs AMS 
the capability class to adopt through the AAI-SBC-RSP management message. 
One attack vector proposed by Blair [11] is to spoof the AAI-SBC-REQ message 
during initial network entry, indicating a low or nil encryption/decryption capability 
class. This is expected to cause the ABS to adopt a low or nil encryption for the 
connection and to command AMS to do so within an AAI_SBC-RSP. 
Alternatively, an attacker can spoof an AAI_SBC-RSP management 
message with capability classes that match neither those requested by AMS nor 
those instructed by ABS. As a result, a mismatch in parameters between ABS 
and AMS can arise, thus, disrupting communications. This attack vector was 





4.  Neighbor Advertisement (AAI-NBR-ADV) 
The AAI-NBR-ADV management message is broadcast by an ABS to 
provide channel information about neighboring BSs. An attacker can spoof AAI-
NBR-ADV with a fake BS or falsely report poor characteristics of neighboring 
ABSs to hamper AMSs from initiating handover to an ABS with better 
characteristics. This vulnerability was identified for the legacy standard [7 and 8] 
and still exists in 802.16m-2011. This attack vector was verified after 
investigating the IEEE standard [15], Sections 16.2.3.13 and 16.2.3. 
5. Location-based Service Advertisement (AAI-LBS-ADV) 
An ABS that supports Location Based Services (LBS) uses the AAI-LBS-
ADV message to broadcast LBS related configuration information. The ABS may 
broadcast the message periodically without solicitation. The message provides 
the AMS with the geo-location of neighboring ABSs which can be used by the 
AMS for triangularization or trilaterization to determine location. The message 
also contains time and frequency information to improve GPS receiver 
performance on the AMS [14]. If both ABS and AMS support LBS in the network, 
it may be possible to spoof AAI-LBS-ADV with the wrong latitude and longitude 
coordinates for the serving ABS and the neighboring ABSs; by doing this, it will 
confuse the AMS of its own location and, thus, degrade the GPS’s performance. 
Alternatively, since the physical locations of all the ABSs in the area are available 
in the message, the ABSs are prone to physical attack, resulting in permanent 
network damage. This attack vector was developed after investigating the IEEE 
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VII. ATTACKS ON LEGACY SYSTEMS 
Attacks on the legacy systems are significantly easier due to two factors. 
The first factor is that UL and DL MAPs are available; thus, besides attacking the 
broadcast messages, the unicast messages can also be targeted. The second 
factor is that the legacy control messages are not encrypted since the ICV is only 
implemented for IEEE 802.16m-2011. This makes obtaining network information 
significantly easier. The following subsections discuss some of the possible 
vulnerabilities. 
A. ADVANCED ANTENNA SYSTEM (AAS) RELATED ATTACKS 
The advanced antenna system (AAS) is a multiple-antenna scheme, that 
allows beam forming using adaptive array techniques. An AAS_Beam_Select 
message can be sent by the MS to inform the BS about a preferred beam. This 
message may be spoofed to change the preferred beam and cause disruption in 
communications. This attack vector was developed after investigating the IEEE 
standard [13], Sections 6.3.2.3.36 and 11.1.2. 
B. POWER RELATED ATTACKS 
1. Fast Power Control (FPC) 
FPC is a control message used by BS to adjust power levels of multiple 
MSs. As identified in previous literature [8], by spoofing this message, an 
attacker can reduce or increase MS transmission power, which ranges from +32 
dB to 32 dB, in steps of 0.25 dB. If the power level is reduced, the BS is unable 
to receive the transmission. If the power level is increased, excessive 
interference can result [8]. This is equivalent to the AAI-ULPC-NI message in the 
IEEE 802.16m standard. This attack vector was verified after investigating the 
IEEE standard [13], Section 6.3.2.3.34 and 11.1.2. 
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C. ARQ RELATED ATTACKS 
ARQ related control messages are not protected, and several messages 
can be spoofed to disrupt error-control operations. Some of the ARQ attacks are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
1. ARQ-Feedback 
This standalone ARQ feedback message can be used to signal any 
combination of different ARQ ACKs (cumulative, selective, selective with 
cumulative). By listening and transmitting spoofed ARQ-feedback messages, it 
may be possible to misalign ARQ sequences between the BS and MS, thus, 
disrupting communications. This attack vector was developed after investigating 
the IEEE 802.16-2009 standard [13], Sections 6.3.2.3.30 and 11.1.2. 
2. ARQ-Discard 
The transmitter sends the ARQ-Discard control message when it wants to 
skip a certain number of ARQ blocks in the ARQ transmission window. By 
listening and transmitting spoofed ARQ discard messages, it is possible for an 
attacker to misalign ARQ sequences between the BS and MS, thus, disrupting 
communications. This attack vector was developed after investigating the IEEE 
802.16-2009  standard [13], Sections 6.3.2.3.31 and 11.1.2. 
3. ARQ-Reset 
This control message is sent by the transmitter or the receiver of an ARQ-
enabled transmission to reset the parent connection's ARQ transmitter and 
receiver state machines. As identified in previous literature, by spoofing ARQ-
reset, an attacker can misalign ARQ sequences between the BS and MS [6]. 
This attack vector was verified after investigating the IEEE 802.16-2009  
Standard [13], sections 6.3.2.3.32 and 11.1.2. 
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D.  MIMO RELATED ATTACKS 
The BS can set up long-term MIMO precoding with feedback with a 
particular MS by sending a “long-term MIMO precoding” (PRC-LT-CTRL) 
message. This message can be spoofed to turn on/off a long-term MIMO 
precoding with feedback, as well as to set a precoding application delay, with the 
objective of causing a mismatch between the BS and MS to disrupt 
communications. This attack vector was developed after investigating the IEEE 
802.16-2009  standard [13] Section 6.3.2.3.56 and 11.1.2. 
E. FLOODING ATTACKS 
1. Ranging Request (RNG-REQ) 
This possible form of attack involves repeated transmission of RNG-REQ 
messages for initial ranging to tie up ABS resources and deny entry for legitimate 
MSs. This attack is possible because this message is unauthenticated during the 
initial network entry. This attack vector was developed after investigating the 
IEEE 802.16-2009  standard [13], Sections 6.3.2.3.5 and 11.1.2. 
2. Reset Command (RES-CMD) 
The RES-CMD message forces an MS to reset itself, reinitialize its MAC, 
and repeat the initial system access. This message was previously identified as a 
vulnerability and authentication was added to protect it. However, this protection 
merely restricts the window of application from any time, previously, to during 
network entry period. Hence, the RES-CMD message can still be injected during 
this small window to deny network access for a legitimate MS. 
The window of opportunity is identified to be between after completion of 
the ranging process and before the establishment of a security association (after 
which applicable messages will be encrypted and authenticated). This attack 
vector was developed from an understanding of the IEEE 802.16-2009  standard 
[13], sections 6.3.2.3.22 and 11.1.2. 
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F. WATER TORTURE ATTACKS 
1. Traffic Indication (MOB-TRF-IND) 
MSs can enter sleep mode to conserve power with an assigned SLPID 
(sleep ID). The sleeping MSs are allocated listening windows so they can wake 
up momentarily to listen for messages destined for them. Like the AAI-TRF-IND 
message introduced earlier, the MOB-TRF-IND message is a broadcast 
message sent by the BS; it indicates the presence of downlink traffic to a group 
of AMSs that have the same SLPID (see Figure 50 for an illustration of the sleep 
mode operation). With a negative indication of the downlink traffic, the MS 
returns to sleep for the rest of the listening cycle to conserve power. With a 
positive indication of the downlink traffic, the MS remains awake during the rest 
of its listening cycle. By repeatedly spoofing the MOB-TRF-IND message with a 
positive indication, an attacker can increase battery drain on MSs within the cell. 
This vulnerability has been identified for legacy systems in [5], [7], and [8] and 
was verified after investigating the IEEE 802.16-2009  standard [13], Sections 
6.3.2.3.41 and 11.1.2. 
2. BS Broadcast Paging (MOB-PAG-ADV) 
The MOB-PAG-ADV (the predecessor of AAI-PAG-ADV) message can be 
used to page MSs in idle mode (to conserve power) to trigger them to join the 
network. The message can be spoofed to cause an MS to increase its battery 
drain. This attack vector was developed after investigating the IEEE 802.16-2009  
standard [13], Sections 6.3.2.3.51 and 11.1.2. 
G.  OTHER GENERAL MESSAGE MODIFICATION ATTACKS 
1. UL Channel Descriptor (UCD), Downlink Channel Descriptor 
(DCD), UL-MAP and DL-MAP 
The UCD, DCD, UL-MAP and DL-MAP together serve to define the UL 
and DL channels. Modification or scrambling of these unprotected management 
messages result in disruption of communications. This attack vector was 
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developed after investigating the IEEE 802.16-2009 standard [13], Sections 
6.3.2.3.3, 6.3.2.3.1, 6.3.2.3.2, 6.3.2.3.4, and 11.1.2. 
2. Multicast Assignment Request (MCA-REQ) 
As identified in previous literature [8], an attacker can spoof a multicast 
assignment request message (MCA-REQ) to remove an MS from Multicast 
Polling Group. If an MS is removed from a polling group, it has to use the 
mandatory contention based bandwidth-allocation algorithm, which results in a 
greater uplink delay. This attack vector was verified after investigating the IEEE  
802.16-2009 standard [13], Sections 6.3.2.3.18 and 11.1.2. 
3.  Downlink Burst Profile Change Request (DBPC-REQ) 
The DBPC-REQ management message is sent by the MS to the BS on 
the MS basic CID channel to request a change in the downlink burst profile used 
by the BS to transport data to the MS. As identified in previous literature [8], an 
attacker can spoof this message to change the profile to one with higher speed 
but less robust. This can result in high bit error rates. The attack vector was 
verified after investigating the IEEE 802.16-2009 standard [13], Sections 
6.3.2.3.20 and 11.1.2. 
4. Network Clock Comparison (CLK-CMP) 
For service flows carrying information that requires the MSs to reconstruct 
the network clock, CLK-CMP messages are periodically broadcasted by the BS. 
An attacker may spoof the CLK-CMP messages to misalign MS/BS clocks. This 
attack vector was developed after investigating the IEEE 802.16-2009  standard 
[13], Sections 6.3.2.3.25 and 11.1.2. 
5.  Neighbor Advertisement (MOB-NBR-ADV) 
The MOB-NBR-ADV management message is broadcast by a BS to 
provide channel information about neighboring BSs, which is normally provided 
within DCD/UCD message transmissions. The attacker can spoof MOB_NBR-
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ADV message with a fake BS or falsely report poor characteristics of neighboring 
BSs to hamper MSs from initiating handover to a BS with better characteristics. 
This vulnerability was previous identified [7 and 8]. This attack vector was verified 





VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Possible security weaknesses for both the legacy WiMAX standard and 
IEEE 802.16m-2011 were examined in this thesis. To assist the reader, a 
summary of key aspects of the standard was provided, with appropriate 
emphasis on areas relevant to understanding the discussion. 
The IEEE 802.16 has come a long way in terms of capability and security. 
Early identified vulnerabilities stemmed from one key weakness: a lack of 
authentication and encryption for control messages. This was addressed 
progressively through adoption of authentication for some of these messages. 
While IEEE 802.16-2009 offered significant improvements over its predecessors, 
a number of control messages remain unauthenticated and unencrypted. In 
addition to the vulnerabilities identified in previous literature, twelve additional 
attack vectors using control messages were proposed in this thesis. These 
vulnerabilities can be categorized as transmission power attacks, MIMO related 
attacks, flooding or denial-of-service attacks, water torture attacks, ARQ related 
attacks, advanced antenna system related attacks, and other miscellaneous 
attacks. 
IEEE 802.16m-2011 is a significant revision (with a new set of control 
messages introduced), structurally enhanced to increase privacy as well as raise 
barriers to attacks while maintaining backward compatibility with legacy 
standards. By introducing encryption for the first time for some control messages, 
the new standard reduces exposure of system operating information that may be 
used against it. More significantly, by scrambling the A-MAPs using secret initial 
vectors exchanged securely during security negotiations upon network entry, the 
passive listener will have difficulty identifying how radio resources are allocated. 
This effectively prevents exploitation of all unicast control messages and  
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enhances privacy. Nonetheless, broadcast control messages are still open to 
exploitation, with a significant number of vulnerabilities in IEEE 802.16-2009 still 
existing in this revision. 
The review of the new control message set in this thesis yielded thirteen 
attack vectors not discussed in previous literatures. These vulnerabilities can be 
categorized as transmission power attacks, MIMO related attacks, flooding or 
denial-of-service attacks, water-torture attacks, and other miscellaneous attacks. 
The outlook of the standard in terms of control channel security is 
summarized in Table 15. 




































The emphasis of this thesis was to examine the IEEE 802.16m-2011 
standard and the legacy standard for vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, drawing from 
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the preceding conclusions, there are two key areas that require further work, and 
the findings in this thesis serve to highlight the urgency. 
1. Protection of Broadcast Control Messages 
We see that, although, most unicast control messages were progressively 
protected through authentication and/or encryption over the years, all broadcast 
messages were left unprotected till the present.  
A common symmetrical key system can be selected by the BS and 
distributed to all MSs during network entry and periodically in a secure manner. 
This key can be used to decrypt broadcast messages encrypted by the BS using 
the same key. Though a symmetrical key has its own set of limitations, 
especially, in terms of key management, this is far superior than to leave all 
broadcast control messages in the plain. 
2. Protection of Network Entry Process 
Another significant area where we found a number of vulnerabilities is the 
network entry process, especially before the establishment of security 
association. This lack of protection makes it possible for spoofed control 
messages like AAI-RES-CMD to be inserted to reset the MAC, thus, interrupting 
network entry. Various forms of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol have 
been proposed to provide some form of interim protection to secure the initial 
ranging and capability negotiation processes [10], [11]. 
C.  FUTURE WORK 
1. Further Expanding Scope of Vulnerability Analysis 
No security analysis can be comprehensive, especially with a standard as 
complex as the IEEE 802.16. There will always be room to analyze the standard 
further to uncover more vulnerabilities. The focus of this thesis was confined to 
that of control and management messages in the context of a single cell 
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operation. Further research can be performed with the focus and scope shifted to 
other aspects or modes of operation, such as handover. 
2. Study of Means of Working around the Scrambling of 
Assignment A-MAP 
With IEEE 802.16m-2011, the assignment A-MAP, which contains 
information on resource allocation within each frame, is scrambled using the 
AMS’s STID and a binary sequence generated by a pseudo-random binary 
sequence (PRBS) generator. The PRBS generator is initialized with a vector 
passed to the AMS by the ABS in a secure manner during network entry. As a 
result, an attacker will not be able to ascertain how resources are allocated within 
the frame or identify recipients. This effectively renders all attacks using unicast 
control messages infeasible. If there is an effective means to overcome or work 
around this, the AAI-UL-POWER-ADJ message (described in Section V.C.2) can 
be used to manipulate an AMS’s transmission power individually. This capability 
will complement that of AAI-ULPC-NI message spoofing, which is used to 
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